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Crowdsourcing A Trademark:
What the Public Giveth, the Courts May
Taketh Away
by
LLEWELLYN JOSEPH GIBBONS *

Abstract
There is a long tradition of trademark holders relying on the
public to create designations that they then adopt as a trademark.
Historically, this has been a long and slow process. Acquiring
secondary meaning from the individual’s first use of the designation
could take years. Web 2.0 and other forms of social media have the
potential to speed up this process through the use of User Generated
Content (UGC). Frequently, coined designations are nicknames for
well-known brands, so they are potentially quite valuable.
Trademark law is ambiguous regarding who owns a designation
created by the public, if the individual claiming the mark has not
appropriated the mark by actually using it in commerce. Ownership
of the mark is one of the elements of a claim of trademark
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infringement. The public use doctrine attempts to solve this problem
by imputing the public’s non-commercial use of the designation as a
commercial use for the benefit of the referent-mark holder, and so
permits the referent-mark holder to appropriate rights in the mark
without actually using it in commerce. The public use doctrine is a
weak basis on which to claim a crowd-sourced mark; therefore, this
article looks at alternative remedies that are available to the referentmark holder, and concludes that unfair competition or infringement
by trademark dilution are better remedies.

I. Introduction
The crowd sourcing of trademarks is not new. In 1916, Planters
1
Peanuts held a contest to develop its logo. For over a century,
contests and competitions to name new products or to write new
advertising jingles have been common methods of tapping into the
2
“wisdom of crowds.”
However, these models of discovering
potential trademarks have one salient fact. The crowd (much like an
advertising agency) coins the designation; the merchant then
appropriates the designation by using it in commerce and thus the
merchant transforms the otherwise eligible designation into a
protectable trademark.
The laws governing these cases are
traditional principles of trademark law. The ownership of the mark
belongs to the merchant; because the origin of the mark is irrelevant,
the merchant, through bona fide use in commerce, appropriates the
mark from the public domain.
Traditionally, the process took years or even generations; the
public created a new designation, that designation acquired secondary
meaning, and then achieved commercial significance. Perhaps the
designation of Coke is the best example of this process and has
3
ultimately become one of the most valuable global marks: COKE.

1. PLANTERS PEANUTS http://www.planters.com/history.aspx?section=timeline (last
visited Oct. 17, 2012).
2. See generally JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS (Anchor Books
2005); See also Sitaram Asur and Bernardo A. Huberman, Predicting the Future with
Social Media, WI-IAT ‘10 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2010 IEEE/WIC/ACM INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON WEB INTELLIGENCE AND INTELLIGENT AGENT TECHNOLOGY,
Volume 01, at 492 (2010) available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1914092 (“social
media can be construed as a form of collective wisdom”).
3. The Coca-Cola brand is estimated to be worth $71.8 billion dollars. See
http://www.interbrand.com/en/best-global-brands/previous-years/Best-Global-Brands2011-report.aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2012). Coca-Cola (Coke) and Diet Coke are their
two best selling products. See Leon Stafford, Coca-Cola Holds Top Spot, but Category
Keeps Loosing Market Share, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, (Mar. 20, 2012),
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Around 1915, the public coined the designation Coke as a nickname
4
for Coca-Cola. Initially, Coca-Cola actively discouraged its use of
the designation Coke to refer to its products. Coca-Cola did not
5
publically embrace the designation Coke until June 1941. One may
assume that it took 26 years before the designation Coke achieved
sufficient commercial success and the Coca-Cola Company felt the
need to formally appropriate the Coke designation as the COKE
trademark. Often, pre-Web 2.0, the referent-mark holder could
patiently wait to determine whether the designation appeared to be
gaining commercial recognition among consumers and only then did
the referent-mark holder have to decide whether to appropriate the
6
designation.
This may no longer be true. Although, not a crowd sourced
mark, the APP STORE mark example is offered as evidence
of how quickly the strength of a mark can change in the Web
2.0 era. A merely descriptive designation such as APP
STORE can go from a weak mark to a strong famous mark in
barely twenty-seven months, from first use in commerce to the
7
filing of litigation. In Apple, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., Apple
sued Amazon.com, Inc. for trademark infringement over the
8
APP STORE mark. The origin of the designation App Store

http://www.ajc.com/news/business/coca-cola-holds-top-spot-but-category-keepslosing/nQSLy/. This article will endeavor to use italics to indicate a publicly coined
designation, all CAPS to indicate a trademark, and upper and lower case letters when
discussing the mark. So, Coke is a publically coined designation that was adopted by
Coke as the COKE trademark.
4. See Phil Mooney, Comment to Coke Means Coca-Cola, COCA-COLA
CONVERSATIONS,
(June
16,
2008,
5:43
PM),
https://www.cocacolaconversations.com/2008/06/coke-means-coca.html.
5. See Phil Mooney, Coke Means Coca-Cola, COCA-COLA CONVERSATIONS, (June
16, 2008), https://www.coca-colaconversations.com/2008/06/coke-means-coca.html. But
Coca-Cola did litigate the use of the Coke designation by others as early as 1916. See
Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of America, 235 F. 408 (D. Ariz. 1916), rev’d on other
grounds, 255 F. 894 (9th Cir. 1919), rev’d on other grounds, 254 U.S. 143 (1920).
6. The term referent-mark refers to the senior mark or brand to which the publicly
coined designation refers.
7. Apple, Inc. v. Amazon.com Inc., 100 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1835, 1840-41 (N.D. Cal.
2011) (assuming without deciding that APP STORE is a descriptive mark which “arguably
acquired secondary meaning.”); id. at 1844 (rejecting Apple’s claim that APP STORE is
a famous mark); see also section, IV.A, infra discussing the APP STORE mark’s claim to
fame.
8. Apple, Inc., 100 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1836 (Apple asserted five causes of action—(1)
trademark infringement, false designation of origin, and false description under section
43(a) of the Lanham Act, (2) dilution under section 43(c) Lanham Act; (3) trademark
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is hotly contested. 9 Interestingly, Apple claims to have coined
10
the designation App Store, and Amazon vigorously denied
11
Apple’s claim to have coined the mark. Although APP
STORE was technically not a crowd-sourced mark, this mark
12
was not developed internally by Apple or by its agents.
Rather, another company fielded the “app store” idea to
Apple, which critiqued the idea because it needed a large13
scale platform in order to be functional. The smaller,
company prior to any actual use in commerce, then
abandoned its Lanham Act § 1(b) intent to use trademark
application for the APP STORE mark and the related
Internet domain name www.appstore.com on December 5,
14
15
2008, and selected a new mark. On July 17, 2008, Apple
filed an application for trademark registration based on use in
commerce.
Meanwhile, starting in July 2008, Apple started to license apps
16
and to distribute them through its App Store portal on iTunes; in
September 2010, Amazon started to solicit software developers to
develop Android apps; and by March 2011, when Amazon.com
started to use the “app store” to license Android based applications,
infringement under common law; (4) dilution under common law; and (5) unfair
competition under California Business & Professions Code § 17200.)
9. Id.
10. See Second Amended Complaint at 2, Apple, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 100
CV
11-01327 PJH) available at
U.S.P.Q.
2d 1835 (2011) (No.
https://web2.westlaw.com/result/previewcontroller.aspx?TF=756&TC=4&tc=1&mt=321&sv=Split&rp=%2ffind%2fdefault.wl&findtype=Y&ordoc=2025619711&serial
num=2026554812&vr=2.0&fn=_top&tf=&pbc=449C7A0F&rs=WLW12.07&RP=/find/defa
ult.wl&bLinkViewer=true.
11. Amazon.com, Inc., 100 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1843.
12. See Larry Dignan, Apple’s App Store and a Little Trademark History,
TECHREPUBLIC, (March 22, 2011), http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/mac/apples-appstore-and-a-little-trademark-history/1063, March 22, 2011.
13. Id.
14. Trademark Status and Document Retrival for No. 78907865, UNITED STATES
PATENT
AND
TRADEMARK
OFFICE
(http://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=78907865&caseType=SERIAL_NO&searchType=sta
tusSearch)(filed an intent to use application in 2006 which they abandoned in 2008).
However, the first attempt to register the mark APPSTORE was by Sage Networks, which
abandoned their attempt to trademark APPSTORE in 2000. Dignan, supra 12.
15. Dignan, supra note 12.
16. Trademark Status and Document Retrival for No. 77525433, UNITED STATES
PATENT
AND
TRADEMARK
OFFICE
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=77525433&caseType=SERIAL_NO&searchType=stat
usSearch
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Apple contended that the APP STORE mark had already become a
famous mark. However, by December 2008, the New York Times ran
a story “It began with Apple’s iPhone App Store, then spread to the
Google Android Market; the Palm App Store opened this week and
17
the BlackBerry Store opens in March.” The story later added insult
to injury by using the term app store in a generic sense to mean a
18
place where one purchases computer applications (apps). The New
York Times article reflected a consumer understanding of the
designation app store.
This article theorizes that this process, from the public coining of
the designation to the designation achieving commercial significance,
will develop increasingly faster as the use of social media becomes
seamlessly woven into the public’s (and more importantly, a
consumer’s) social interaction with the brand, and the increasing
ability of consumers to communicate with others interested in the
brand. Recently, scholarship indicates that only a handful of mavens
19
or taste leaders can tip social desirability of a product.
The
technological change represented in Web 2.0 and social media may
reconceptualize the role of the public from that of a passive recipient
of a mark created by the brand holder to the public as an active force
in creating new commercially significant designations.
This article explores the legal issues involved when the crowd,
though common or popular use, bestows a new designation on the
referent-trademark holder’s goods or services. The crowd’s gifting of
a designation creates potential problems for the recipient merchant.
The merchant must decide to reject (abandon) or accept the
designation. This decision will affect whether the merchant is or can
become a trademark holder of the public designation. If the
merchant rejects the designation through non-use or running counter

17. David Pogue, Envelop, Please. It’s a Pogie, NY TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008 at B1. See
Lanham Act § 43(c)(1)(G)(“the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by
third parties” as a factor of trademark dilution fame).
18. Id. (“[a]n app store turns the smartphone into something . . . the cellphone app
store takes the trophy as the Tech Idea of the Year.”).
19. See generally, Malcolm Gladwell, THE TIPPING POINT: HOW LITTLE THINGS
CAN MAKE A BIG DIFFERENCE (2002). It is not a new phenomenon. Clark Gable’s bare
chest in the motion picture It Happened One Night allegedly sent undershirt sales
plummeting. See Amy T. Peterson and Ann T. Kellogg, THE GREENWOOD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLOTHING THROUGH AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900 TO THE PRESENT:
VOLUME 1, 1900-1949, at 277-78 (Greenwood 2008)(the practice of leaving the last button
of a men’s vest undone following the example of King Edward VII). See also Alan J.
Flusser, STYLE AND THE MAN, at 14 (HarperCollins 1996).
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advertising, the designation should remain in the public domain as far
as trademark ownership is concerned. However, if the merchant
eventually accepts the designation, the plaintiff must show that the
plaintiff owns a valid trademark as an element of a claim of
trademark infringement. The law is unclear about whether the
trademark can be appropriated from the public domain absent actual
bona fide use in commerce or whether the public use is imputed to
the referent-mark holder, as well as what the priority date for a crowd
sourced mark is: some date within the period that it was first used by
the public or the actual bona fide first use by the referent-mark
holder? Finally, the law is equally unclear on what remedies, if any,
are there for the unauthorized use of the public’s designation,
provided it has not been properly appropriated from the public
domain.
This article concludes that if the merchant did not appropriate the
designation, a competitor’s use of the designation may be actionable
under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act as a form of unfair
competition, but is not actionable under that section as trademark
infringement. However, if the public’s designation has acquired
commercial secondary meaning, then it may be a basis on which to
oppose or cancel a federal trademark registration. Therefore, this
article recommends that sophisticated mark holders should be alert
for new public designations of their products and consider
appropriating these designations at the earliest opportunity, either
through the early development common law trademark rights or
through federal registration, especially if the designation appears
poised to become commercially significant. However, this may be
easier said than done in an age of instant fame and social media
interconnectivity.

II. Social Media
New forms of social media will increase the rate at which
consumers accept a new publically coined designation to represent
existing marks. In addition, social media will also increase the
rapidity with which public designations achieve commercial
20
significance. Web 2.0 is a technological platform on which User
21
Generated Content (UGC) is built; social media is one form of user-

20. See Andreas M. Kaplan and Michael Haenlein, Users of the World, Unite! The
Challenges and Opportunities of Social Media, 53 BUS. HORIZONS 59, 61 (2010).
21. See generally Social Media, WIKPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_media.
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generated content. 22 UGC must be published on a publically
available site; demonstrate some creativity; and be created outside of
23
A mere exchange of email,
the users’ professional endeavors.
unchanged reposting/redistribution of preexisting content, or
commercial advertising does not count. UGC existed long before
Web 2.0; however, broadband, new software, and the increase in the
public’s use and acceptance of technology have resulted in a new
24
digital environment. Social media has been defined as “a group of
Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and
technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and
25
exchange of User Generated Content.” The actual technologies,
norms, and practices of social media are not static and continue to
evolve in the context of changes in technology, social norms, and
laws.
This article postulates that one proxy to demonstrate the
influence of Web 2.0 and social media in creating new designations is
to consider the increase in the rate of new words being recognized in
dictionaries. Editors of dictionaries recognize new words based on
26
their persistent use by the public. One expert has opined, “With the
explosion of digital media and convergence devices, people are
creating and using new words more widely and at a greater pace than
27
Further, between 1993 and again in 1997, the Oxford
usual.”
English Dictionary (OED) added approximately 3,000 words or
28
about 1,000 words per year. Recently, the OED has been adding
29
words at the rate of approximately 4,000 words per year. One may
speculate that since the increase in the rate of newly recognized
words correlates well with the development of Web 2.0, an increase in
User Generated Content (UGC), and the growth of social media,

22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 61.
25. Id.
26. See generally Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word; Dictionary Shopping in the
Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 292-94 (1998) (describing how editors create
dictionary entries).
27. Hannah Boen, New Words Added to Dictionary not a Surprise to Area Language
REPORTER
NEWS
(Aug.
15,
2012),
Lovers,
http://www.reporternews.com/news/2012/aug/15/new-words-added-to-dictionary-not-asurprise-to/?print=1.
28. See Oxford English Dictionary, WIKIPEDIA (last visited Sept. 18, 2012, 12:59),
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oxford_English_Dictionary.
29. Id.
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there is some positive relationship between the creation of new words
and changes in consumer communication.
If the public can develop a brand and destroy a brand, then the
public can surely create designations for products that will quickly
30
become widespread and achieve commercial significance. Word-ofmouth has always been a critical part of any brand building strategy,
and word of mouth has gone viral in the Web 2.0 milieu. One
commentator observed, “online word of mouth poses the most
31
“The
important challenge to the Internet trademark law.”
technology that was supposed to empower marketers has empowered
32
consumers instead.” Prior to the Internet, individual taste-shapers
33
At the
were able to share their opinions with a few friends.
beginning of Web 2.0, a few years ago, these same individuals could
blog or post something on their websites that may be read by a few
34
close members of their family and their circle of friends. Until very
recently, the dominant force creating brands and brand images was
the brand owner, who used pricing, the consumer’s product
experience, commercial advertising, and retail-space interactions with
35
consumers to develop the brand image. However, even pre-Web
2.0, brand owners recognized that consumer word of mouth or
36
consumer buzz could mean success or failure of a brand.
Historically, these influential mavens of taste had to work through
connectors and salespeople to get the message out. Social media
creates a process of disintermediation that permits the mavens or
taste-leaders to directly reach the end user without necessarily using
connectors, weakening or eliminating the importance of salespeople.
Social media now absorbs and extends the reach of the connector and
30. W. Glynn Mangold & David J. Faulds, Social Media: The New Hybrid Element
of the Promotion Mix, 52 BUS. HORIZONS 357, 359 (2009).
31. Eric Goldman, Online Word of Mouth and its Implications for Trademark Law, in
TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 404,
(Graeme B. Dinwoodie and Mark D. Janis, eds., Edward Elgar Press 2007), available at
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020695.
32. Susan Fournier & Jill Avery, The Uninvited Brand, 54 BUS. HORIZONS 193, 193
(2011).
33. See Gladwell, supra note 19 at 179 (social networks rarely exceeded 150 people).
34. See Mangold & Faulds, supra note 30 at 359 (“Conventional marketing wisdom
has long held that a dissatisfied customer tells ten people. That is out of date. In the age
of social media, he or she has the tools to tell 10 million”).
35. See Fournier & Avery, supra note 32 at 194.
36. See Goldman, supra note 30, at 409; David Court, Dave Elzinga, Susan Mulder,
and Ole Jorgen Vetvik, The Consumer Decision Journey, MCKINSEY QUARTERLY (June
2009), http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/The_consumer_decision_journey_2373, (67% of
consumer purchase decisions are primarily influencedby word of mouth).
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salesperson function into Web 2.0 technology, thus rapidly facilitating
new crowd-sourced public designations for existing products. The
scope of social media use is also increasing the potential range of a
connector-community.
Today, social media has provided the average person with a huge
megaphone to amplify their influence to shape consumer-tastes in the
future and unprecedented opportunities to saturate trademarks with
37
new meaning. Empowered by Internet technology, consumers can
infuse a brand with buzz, investing it with magnetism and economic
value, or they can force a trademark into oblivion even against the
wealthiest content owners. One commentator observed that “the
separate nature of many brand relationships—the ‘them’ and ‘us’—is
38
obsolete.”
Web 2.0 technology, especially social media, reduces consumer
39
costs to disseminate their views widely. Web 2.0 technologies permit
the consumer to expand the scope of his or her social network beyond
his or her physical social network, and permits members of the virtual
social network to “like,” “re-tweet,” or forward a message to
40
members of their social networks. Unlike oral speech, which is
ephemeral, and written speech in the physical world, which is difficult
to locate, web content is easily located, and may be accessible
41
forever:
[N]ew online intermediaries [such as Amazon.com, eBay,
TripAdvisor] have emerged to systematically capture and
republish consumer opinion. Search engines have further
concentrated the value of the public designation or word of
mouth. Brand owners compete with blogs, opinion sites, and
other consumer speech for a prominent place in the search
42
engine results.
Even if the brand is prominently featured in a search engine
result, it may be surrounded by critical consumer commentary. One
37. See generally State of the Media: The Social Media Report, NIELSEN, Q3 (2011)
(“60 percent of social media users create reviews of products and services” and
“consumer-created reviews/ratings are the preferred source for information about
product/service value, price and product quality”).
38. See Deborah R. Gerhardt, Social Networks and the Law: Social Media Amplify
Consumer Investmetn in Trademarks, 90 N.C.L. REV. 1491, 1499 (2012).
39. See Goldman, supra note 31, at 411.
40. See Fournier & Avery, supra, at 194 & 200.
41. See Goldman, supra note 31, at 411.
42. See Goldman, supra note 31, at 412.
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commentator concluded that “a single consumer, through favorable
search engine placement, might influence thousands or even millions
of potential customers, and because online word of mouth can survive
indefinitely, the Internet ‘remembers’ a trademark owner’s historical
43
choices and practices.”
Consumer communication through Web 2.0 and social media may
44
be described as networks composed of nodes and connected by ties.
45
Of course, not all ties are created equal. There are leaders and
followers among the nodes so that the sharing of information is
46
asymmetrically reciprocal. These leaders may be described as brand
mavens or brand advocates and have a disproportionate influence on
47
consumers’ choices and brand development. This process is roughly
analogous to the social process that creates sudden change described
by Malcolm Gladwell in The Tipping Point: How Little Things can
48
Make a Big Difference. In the model postulated in this Article, the
nodes are individuals or institutional groups and ties represent the
49
sharing of information among groups. Pre-Web 2.0 (and newer
forms of social media such as Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, and
Google+), individual-nodes found it difficult to create ties with other
individual-nodes, which shared common interests. Without the
assistance of social media to locate interested nodes, developing ties
50
among nodes was serendipitous at best. Brands are the social glue
51
that connects many communities of individuals.

43. See Goldman, supra note 31, at 413.
44. See Gerhardt, supra note 38, at 1495.
45. See Eric Gilbert & Karrie Karahalios, Predicting Tie Strength with Social Media,
CHI PROCEEDINGS OF THE 27TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS
IN
COMPUTING
SYSTEMS,
211-220
(2009)
available
at
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1518736.
46. See Gerhardt, supra note 38, at 1495; Ronald A. Clark and Ronald E.
Goldsmith, Market Mavens: Psychological Influences, 22 PSYCHOLOGY & MARKETING
289, 289-90 (April 2005).
47. See Goldman, supra note 31, at 409.
48. See Gladwell, supra note 19, at 19 (discussing mavens).
49. See Gerhardt, supra note 38, at 1495.
50. Other forms of social media also facilitates the creation of ties, for example
review sites such as TripAdvisor or merchants that permit consumers or the public to post
feedback on their experiences with a good or service, and of course, sites which permit
readers to post comments all facilitate the creation of ties. See Gerhardt, supra note 38 at
1495.
51. Id. at 1508.
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The consuming public is often erroneously viewed as merely
52
Recently,
passive consumers of trademarks and brand images.
scholarship suggests that the public is an active player in creating and
53
maintaining brands and their images. Trademark holders, even the
holders of famous marks, tend to be followers rather than leaders
when it comes to using new forms of communication. In the 1990s,
the owners of famous trademarks came to the Internet only to find
that their marks had already been appropriated by cybersquatters as
54
More recently, trademark holders arrived at
domain names.
Facebook and Twitter with the expectations to develop their marks,
only to find that consumers had beat them to these newer forms of
55
social media. In a race between the plodding mark holder and the
cutting edge consumer-market-maven, the consumer will almost
always be the first adopter of any new technology—slowly followed
by a brand and its image consultants.
This results in a world where the story of a brand is one that is
jointly authored by the brand owner and the brand’s adherents or its
critics. No longer are successful consumer brands developed solely or
even primarily through a top down approach which is totally
dominated, if not totally controlled, by the brand owner. Rather,
successful brand development is a collaborative effort between the
brand owner and the public. “Various constituencies of consumers
generate product names, package designs, and advertising for leading
56
contenders.” Further, “marketers engage in rigorous searches for
organically-created brand messages that can be co-opted for the

52. See Leah Chan Grinvald, A Tale of Two Theories of Well-Known Marks, 13
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 6 (2010); Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in
Trademark, 88 N.C.L. REV. 427, 450-53 (2010); Deven R. Desai, Is Pepsi Really a
Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2119, 2127
(2012); Mark P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory Of Trademark Law.
98 VA. L. REV. 67 (2012).
53. See, e.g., Gerhardt, supra, note 38 at 1493; Rebecca Tushnet, Gone In Sixty
Milliseconds: Trademark Law And Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507 (2012); Mark
P. McKenna, A Consumer Decision-Making Theory Of Trademark Law, 98 VA. L. REV.
67 (2012);
54. See Fournier and Avery, supra note 34 at 195; Jonathan Zittrain, ICANN:
Between The Public And The Private—Comments Before Congress, 14 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1071, 1079 (1999).
55. See Michael L. Rustad & Diane D’Angelo, The Path of Internet Law: An
Annotated Guide to Legal Landmarks, 2011 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 12, 1, 58 (2011); See
generally Thomas J.
Curtin, The Name Game: Cybersquatting and Trademark
Infringement on Social Media Websites, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 353 (2010).
56. See Fournier and Avery, supra note 32 at 196.
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benefit of the firm.” 57 Other firms monitor social media twenty-four
58
hours a day, measuring the public’s reaction to the brand.
Consequently, brand holders increasingly recognize the power of the
consuming public using Web 2.0 and social media.

III. Trademark Infringement
The focus of this article is not on the public’s use of an
abbreviation or confusing colorable imitation of a trademark that is
already clearly prohibited under trademark law, for example “Opry”
59
60
for the mark “Grand Ole Opry,” “Coke” for “Coca-Cola,” “Jack”
for “Jack Daniel’s,” or initials, such as “PP” for “Planned
61
62
Parenthood” or “IBM” for “International Business Machines.”
Rather, it focuses on altogether new designations such as “Hog” for
63
64
“Harley-Davidson,” “Mickey D” for “McDonalds,” “Big Blue” for
65
66
“IBM,” or “Tarzhay” or “Tarjay” for Target. These designations

57. Id.
58. Id. at 197.
59. See, e.g., WSM, Inc. v. Bailey, 297 F. Supp. 870, 872-873 (M.D. Tenn. 1969).
60. See, e.g., Coca-Cola v. Busch, 44 F. Supp. 405, 409-10 (Pa. Dist. Ct. 1942).
61. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed. of Am., Inc. v. Problem Pregnancy of
Worcester, Inc., 498 N.E.2d 1044, 1048 (Mass. 1986).
62. Cf. 15 U.S.C. §1114(1)(a) (2006)(prohibiting the commercial use of a
“reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation.”).
63. The mark HOG has been registered by Harley-Davidson for motorcycle repair
services.
See
HOG,
Registration
No.
78432092,
available
at
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=78432092&caseType=SERIAL_NO&searchType=stat
usSearch, but it has been abandoned for exhibitions, motorcycle club services, and
motorcycle competitions.
See HOG, Registration No.
78431581, available at
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=78431581&caseType=SERIAL_NO&searchType=stat
usSearch, but it has been abandoned because of a failure to respond or late response.
64. McDonald’s has registered the mark MICKEY D’S for clothing and restaurant
services.
See MICKEY D’s, Registration No.
1666796, available at
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=74078677&caseType=SERIAL_NO&searchType=stat
usSearch, and MICKEY D’s.
Registration No.
1292557, available at
http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=4010:6obcbf.3.5.
65. The IBM Corp. has abandoned the US registration for the mark BIG BLUE.
See
BIG
BLUE,
Registration
No.
73741661,
available
at
http://tsdr.uspto.gov/#caseNumber=74078677&caseType=SERIAL_NO&searchType=stat
usSearch. IBM used the moniker Big Blue for decades (starting in the 1960s) prior to its
trademark registration in 1989. See Eric Schmitt, From ‘Big Blue’ to Big Blue: Find
TIMES,
May
11,
1989,
Another
Name,
or
Else,
NY
http://www.nytimes.com/1989/05/11/business/from-big-blue-to-big-blue-find-anothername-or-else.html.
66. The author has been unable to find any U.S. trademark registration for the
designations Tarjay or Tarzhay. Target’s chief marketing officer describes these terms as
a “gift” from customers. See Target’s Nickname Tar-zhay (CNBC Video Jan. 3, 2011),
available at http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=1719878893. However, he also stated
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are not merely colorable extensions of an already protected mark. 67
Rather, these designations should be analyzed as marks in their own
right independent of the senior referent-mark or brand. If a crowdsourced designation is adopted or appropriated by the referent-mark
holder and used by the referent-mark holder in commerce as a mark,
then the use by a competitor merely presents a run-of-the-mill
trademark infringement case. However, if the referent-mark holder
has not appropriated the designation, then there are significant
questions regarding the referent-mark holder’s trademark rights to
prevent the designation from being used by others. In order to have a
remedy, there must be a legal right.
Sometimes, however, a merchant will reject the public’s gift of a
designation either by affirmatively discouraging the use of the
public’s designation (for example, Coca-Cola and IBM initially
discouraged the public’s use of COKE and BIG BLUE respectively),
or by ignoring the new designation (for example Tarzhay for
68
Target).
Over time, these public designations may become as
popular (and as valuable), if not more popular than the merchant’s
chosen mark. Seizing an opportunity, a competitor may then take
steps to appropriate the public’s coined designation for its own goods
or services. A competitor’s use of the designation may result in the
loss of some of the goodwill associated with the designation, the
competitor free riding on the reputation of the merchant, and create a
likelihood of consumer confusion or deception.
The question is whether this constitutes likelihood of consumer
confusion trademark infringement. Appropriating the designation by
the putative trademark holder is the sine qua non of trademark
ownership. If trademark ownership does not exist solely through the
public’s use of the designation, then there is a battle for priority and
senior trademark user rights. This is a conflict between a competitor,
who has adopted the public designation by its actual bona fide use in

that Target would never use these terms. See id. I would argue that merely the affectation
of a faux French pronunciation of an English language word mark is not sufficient to
prevent the likelihood of consumer confusion. Cf. Coca-Cola Co. v. Christopher, 37 F.
Supp. 216, 216 (E.D. Mich. 1941) (LA COQ versus COKE).
67. It should go without saying that the author is not opining on the legal rights or
status of any of the marks used as examples in this article. Any use of a mark in the article
is solely illustrative of a point in the discussion, and the mark was selected solely because
the reader is likely to be familiar with the mark.
68. While this Article treats the creation of a public designation as a “gift” to the
referent-mark holder, other models such as the consumer investment model would grant
the public limited recognized rights to use the mark base on their economic and emotional
investment in a brand and its development. See generally Gerhardt, supra note 38.
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commerce, and the referent-mark holder, who was gifted the
designation (and arguably any secondary meaning) without any use in
commerce. Neither party has any substantial claim to a right in the
mark or the protection of equity. Finally, as a matter of public policy,
should principles of “first in time, first in right” property rights in
trademark trump strongly held policies preventing the likelihood of
consumer confusion in resolving these questions?
Under trademark law, the affirmative right granted to a mark
holder is the right to prevent uses in commerce that are likely to
69
result in consumer confusion as to source, origin, or sponsorship. In
addition to the statutory requirements of the Lanham Act, courts
have imposed another essential element of a claim of trademark
infringement under the Lanham Act: the ownership of the alleged
70
infringed mark. In the United States, there are two main bodies of
law that result in mark ownership and under which marks are
71
protected: state common law and the Lanham Trademark Act.
Under either body of trademark law, the mark holder must
appropriate from the public domain a designation capable of
distinguishing its goods or services from that of others through a bona
72
fide use in commerce.
This article will not discuss state common law trademark
infringement versus federal trademark infringement of unregistered
marks in detail, because the test for trademark infringement is
73
substantially the same under either body of law. Both bodies of law
make ownership an essential element in a trademark infringement
claim. There are other requirements to obtain trademark rights. For
example, the mark must have either inherent or acquired secondary
meaning to be capable of functioning as a mark and to distinguish
74
(identify) goods or services as an indicator of source or origin. This

69. Lanham Act § 32(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006) & §43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)
(2006). See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111,
117-18 (2004).
70. Fed. Treasury Enter. Sojuzplodoimport v. Spirits Int’l. N.V., 623 F.3d 61, 69
(2d Cir. 2010)(“we note that ownership of the relevant trademark is one of the “necessary
elements . . . of trademark infringement under the Lanham Act.”).
71. Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 193 (1985).
72. See infra, Part II.A. See also United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248
U.S. 90, 97 (1918)(“[t]here is no such thing as property in a trademark except as a right
appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which the mark is
employed.” ).
73. See 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:1.50
(citing cases and describing state and federal trademark law as “congruent”).
74. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 772-74 (1992).
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article assumes that the public’s gifted designation will otherwise
meet all of the other common law or statutory requirements to serve
as an unregistered mark, except that a merchant asserting trademark
rights in the designation has not actually appropriated the mark by
using it in commerce.
A. State Common Law Trademark Rights

The common law as expounded in the Restatement (Third) of
Unfair Competition (“Restatement”), states that a trademark must be
“used in a manner that identifies those goods or services and
75
distinguishes them from the goods or services of others.” The
Restatement definition might appear to be consistent with an
interpretation that a designation’s use by the crowd is sufficient to
bestow ownership of the mark on a non-using trademark holder.
Section 9 of the Restatement does not appear to require that the use
actually be by the mark holder and would appear that the public’s use
of the designation would be sufficient to accrue trademark rights.
However, section 18 of the Restatement provides that the person
claiming a property interest in the designation does not acquire
trademark rights until
“the designation has been actually used as a trademark . . . [a]
designation is ‘used’ as a trademark . . . when the designation
is displayed or otherwise made known to the prospective
purchasers in the ordinary course of business in a manner that
associates the designation with the goods, services, or business
76
of the user.”
The public’s use of a designation to refer to the mark holder’s
77
goods is arguably not a use in the ordinary course of business. The
public is not in the “business” nor is the public an agent of the person
78
attempting to claim the designation as a mark.
Finally, section 19 of the Restatement provides for the priority of
trademark rights. Section 19 provides that “one who has used a
designation as a trademark . . . under the rule stated in § 18 has

75. RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR
TRADEMARK AND SERVICE MARK § 9 (1995).

COMPETITION: DEFINITIONS OF

76. Id.
77. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION : ACQUISITION OF RIGHTS §
18 (1995).
78. See Illinois High School Ass’n v. GTE Vantage Inc., 99 F.3d 244, 247-48 (7th Cir.
1996).
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priority in the use of the designation . . . (a) in any geographic areas in
which the actor has used the designation in good faith or in which the
designation has become associated with the actor as a result of good
79
faith use before the designation is used in good faith [by another].”
Section 19 presupposes, first, that the use of the mark meets the
requirements of section 18, and then it imposes the additional
requirement that the mark is actually used by the person asserting a
priority in the claimed mark.
Consequently, under the Restatement’s articulation of the
common law of trademark, a person asserting rights in a mark must as
a bare minimum prove that he or she appropriated the designation by
80
the actual bona fide use of the mark in commerce. The language of
the Restatement does not appear to be susceptible to an
interpretation that the mere use by the public as a designation is a
constructive use in the ordinary course of business by the person
81
claiming trademark rights in the designation. There is no common
82
Federal courts
law doctrine of constructive trademark use.
interpreting the common law of trademark have held that “[t]o
acquire ownership of a trademark it is not enough to have invented
the mark first or even to have registered it first; the party claiming
ownership must have been the first to actually use the mark in
83
connection with the sale of goods or services.”

79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION: PRIORITY OF RIGHTS § 19
(1995).
80. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION: ACQUISITION OF RIGHTS §
18; Buying For The Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d 310, 327
(D.N.J. 2006). But see Peter M. Brody, What’s in a Nickname? Or, Can Public use Create
Private Rights?, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 1123, 1145 (2005) (suggesting that the court has
found de facto constructive trademark use for the purpose of standing to oppose a
trademark registration).
81. Cf.
Aktieselskabet AF 21.
November 2001 v.
Fame Jeans, Inc.
525 F.3d 8, 20 (C.A.D.C. 2008)(“At common law, “prior ownership of a mark is only
established as of the first actual use of a mark in a genuine commercial
transaction.”)(citation omitted); Tally-Ho, Inc. v. Coast Community College Dist., 889
F.2d 1018, 1023 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing United States v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82, 85, (1879)).
82. See LOUIS ALTMAN AND MALLA POLLACK, 4A CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMP.,
TR. & MONO. § 26:4 (4th ed.); Beverly W. Pattishall, The Lanham Trademark Act At
Fifty — Some History And Comment, 86 TRADEMARK REP. 442, 447 (1996); but see Nat’l
Cable v. Am. Cinema Editors, 937 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
83. Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMC Int’l, Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir. 1996). See
generally 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COmpetition § 16:1 (4th ed.).

GIBBONS_PRODUCTION_FINAL_2.DOCX

2012

CROWDSOURCING A TRADEMARK

51

B. Federal Unregistered Trademark Rights

Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act protects unregistered
trademarks from uses in interstate and foreign commerce that are
84
likely to cause consumer confusion. Federal registration of a mark
under the Lanham Act is merely federal recognition of trademark
85
rights that are already possessed by the registrant. The Lanham Act
provides that a person must use a designation in interstate commerce
to distinguish, identify, and indicate the source of his or her goods in
86
order to obtain trademark rights. Mere use of a designation by
members of the public is probably insufficient use to obtain federal
87
trademark rights by the referent-mark-holder.
There is some debate regarding the proper interpretation of “use
in commerce” for the purposes of trademark infringement under
section 32(1) of the Lanham Act (registered marks) and section 43(a)
88
(unregistered marks). This debate may also be critical to the proper
understanding of the term “use in commerce’ under section 43(c)(1)
89
Whether “use in
of the Lanham Act (trademark dilution).
commerce” means any commercial use that Congress could
90
constitutionally regulate under the commerce clause or has the much
narrower definition provided in section 45 of the Lanham Act may be
critical in future trademark disputes. The public use of a designation
in this context is comprised of two types of use, the first being the
public’s use of a designation to describe goods or services. Whether
Congress could lawfully regulate private consumer speech in a

84. Id. at 780; Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 2930 (2003). Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act also contains a broad cause of action against
various forms of unfair competition usually involving some form of consumer deception.
McCarthy § 1.9. There is no requirement for trademark ownership to bring an unfair
competition claim. See Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 96, 103
(5th Cir. 1982).
85. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Lessons From The Trademark Use Debate, 92 IOWA
L. REV. 1703, 1710-11 (2007), but see 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 19:8 (4th ed.) (“[The Lanham Act] does not say that the applicant must
also qualify for state common law protection. That coincidentally, the applicant will
usually also meet common law standards is beside the point.”). See generally 15 U.S.C. §
1126(e) (2006)(U.S. trademark registration based on a foreign trademark registration).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006); see also 15 U.S.C. 1051(b) & 1051(d) (2006).
87. See Continental Corrugated Container Corp. v. Continental Group, Inc., 462 F.
Supp. 200, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (“It is doubtful, then, whether a manufacturer can claim
protection for an abbreviation of a trademark that it has never formally used.”).
88. See Goldman, supra note 31, at 414-15 (succinctly summarizing the debate).
89. This quandary will not be further addressed in Part V, trademark dilution.
90. See 15 U.S.C. §1127 (2006)(“The word ‘commerce’ [under the Lanham Act]
means all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress.”).
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commercial transaction is problematic and troubling for First
Amendment scholars, but under the eommerce elause, an extremely
91
narrowly tailored law is probably permissible.
So, if the activity of public use is one that Congress could lawfully
regulate, then the public’s use of a designation may be recognized as a
use in commerce under the Lanham Act. However, if the narrower
definition of “use in commerce” in section 45 of the Lanham Act is
controlling, then the public’s use in commerce must also be a “bona
92
fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of trade.” Clearly, use by
the general public, even among actual consumers to designate a
product, is not a commercial use by the referent-mark holder in the
ordinary course of trade. So, this element to obtain trademark rights
fails unless the referent-mark holder actually uses the public
designation in commerce. Absent a use in commerce, there is no
trademark, and consequently, no legal rights in a mark; therefore,
there is no ownership of a mark by an entity not using the designation
93
in commerce.
Under the Lanham Act, the requirement to actually have a bona
fide use of the mark in commerce is made clear in the distinction
between the use and the intent-to-use basis for an application for
trademark registration. Section 1(b)(4)(c) of the Lanham Act
provides that an “applicant who has made use of the mark in
commerce” may claim the benefits of a use based trademark

91. But cf. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct.
2566, 2587-89(2012)(Roberts, C.J.) & 132 S.Ct. at 2644 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito, J.J. dissenting)(although these four justices join in the dissent, and they did not join
in Chief Justice Robert’s majority opinion, which four justices did not join on the
Commerce Clause issue, there appears to be consensus of five justices on a narrower
judicial interpretation of which non-commercial activities have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause).
92. See 15 U.S.C. §1127 (“The term “use in commerce” means the bona fide use of a
mark in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.
For purposes of this Act, a mark shall be deemed to be in use in commerce-- (1) on goods
when-- (A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or their containers or the displays
associated therewith or on the tags or labels affixed thereto, or if the nature of the goods
makes such placement impracticable, then on documents associated with the goods or
their sale, and (B) the goods are sold or transported in commerce, and (2) on services
when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services and the services are
rendered in commerce, or the services are rendered in more than one State or in the
United States and a foreign country and the person rendering the services is engaged in
commerce in connection with the services.”) (emphasis supplied).
93. See Jim Henson Productions, Inc. v. John T. Brady & Associates, 867 F. Supp.
175, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)(citing Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403
(1916)).
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application. 94 Accordingly, if the merchant asserting an interest in the
public designation associated with its goods or services lacks a
common law interest in the designation based on its own actual use in
commerce in connection with the sale of goods or services, there
would be no basis for a federal registration of that interest. One
exception is an intent-to-use (ITU) application, which does not grant
substantive federal trademark rights until the designation is actually
95
used as a mark in commerce by the entity claiming the mark.
C. Public use Doctrine

As previously discussed, there is no statutory or common-law
basis for protecting a designation that has not been appropriated by a
merchant as a trademark through the merchant’s own (or an agent’s)
96
bona fide use in commerce. Courts are sometimes faced with the
dilemma of either forbidding a competitor’s bad faith use of a public
designation in a manner that creates a likelihood of consumer
confusion or holding fast to the first-in-time, first-in-right, principles
of trademark law. In balancing the interests of the bad faith user of a
public designation and the interest of the public and the merchant to
prevent the likelihood of consumer confusion, the merchant and the
97
98
public usually wins. This has been called the public use doctrine.
The case law underlying the public use doctrine often involves
99
nicknames or abbreviations of well-known marks. Many of these
nicknames were similar in commercial impression to the actual
100
In most of these
trademark, for example COKE for Coca-Cola.

94. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(c) (2006).
95. See McCarthy, supra note 85 at § 19:29. In the alternative, trademark registration
and the associated rights may be based on a foreign trademark registration. Lanham Act
of 1946 § 44(e), 15 U.S.C. §1126(e) (2006).
96. See George & Co, LLC v. Imagination Entm’t Lt’d., 575 F.3d 383, 403 (4th Cir.
2009).
97. Id. (citing 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7:18 (3d ed. 1992)). For example, trademark equitable defenses
such as laches or acquiescence permit the infringer to continue to use the infringed mark
despite a likelihood of consumer confusion because of the failure to act by the mark
holder, and of course, if the mark owner engaged in inequitable conduct, the doctrine of
clean hands may preclude an equitable remedy against the infringer.
98. Brody, supra note 80 at 1125. Mr. Brody must be credited with pulling together
the threads of disparate common law cases and weaving them into a coherent body of
trademark principles that he then called the “public use rule.” Id. at 1126. The first
judicial recognition of Brody’s public use rule was by the Fourth Circuit in George & Co
under the rubric of the public use doctrine. See George & Co, LLC., 575 F.3d at 403.
99. See Brody, supra note 80, at 1123-24.
100. See generally Brody, supra note 80; McCarthy, supra note 97, at § 7:18.
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cases, the court could have or actually did rule on the narrow grounds
that the mark in question was confusingly similar under a theory of
unfair competition. Then the court could expound on principles which
ultimately underlay the theory of the public use doctrine in dicta.
These confusingly similar mark lines of cases are not helpful on the
broader issue of adjudicating rights in a public designation that is not
commercially confusingly similar to the underlying trademark (for
example, MICKEY D’s for McDonalds or BIG BLUE for IBM). So,
the public use doctrine may not be helpful in analyzing the publicly
coined designations that are a focus of this article because they are
designations that are not per-se confusingly similar to the senior
mark. However, as some courts or scholars may apply the public use
doctrine to these non-confusingly similar designations that a
competitor may attempt to adopt as a trademark, a further discussion
of jurisprudential limitations on the public use doctrine is warranted.
1.

History of the Public use doctrine

Case law only weakly supports the public use doctrine. The
seminal article on the public use doctrine traces its use back to CocaCola, Co. v. Koke Co. of America, which involved Coca-Cola
litigating a series of cases against different defendants regarding
rights associated with one of the world’s most famous trademarks, the
101
COKE trademark. In the Koke Co. case, Koke Co. adopted KOKE
102
Unfortunately, Koke Co. never
as a trademark in bad fait
challenged Coca-Cola’s right to the COKE mark, and the courts
assumed that without explicit analysis of this issue, that the
designation Coke was a mark and the rights to COKE belonged to the
103
The judicial gloss on this case focused on
Coca-Cola Company.
principles of unfair competition, protection of the consumer, and
punishment of inequitable conduct. The court did not address
traditional trademark infringement under the likelihood of consumer
104
standards.
In later litigation, courts more explicitly associated the Coke
designation with Coca-Cola’s goodwill and stopped Coca-Cola’s

101. See Brody, supra note 80, at 1126-27.
102. Koke Co. of America v. Coca-Cola Co., 255 F. 894, 895 (9th Cir. 1919), rev’d on
other grounds, 254 U.S. 143 (1920).
103. Brody, supra note 80, at 1127. There is no explanation for why these issues were
not raised except that the courts may have found the dispute regarding whether the
presence of cocaine or the lack thereof in the Coca-Cola syrup deceived the public and
should bar Coca-Cola’s action a more interesting topic of discussion.
104. Id.
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competitors from using phonetically similar marks such as LA COQ 105
106
or KOKE-UP. In the case involving the LA COQ mark, the court
went one step further from the solid grounding of unfair competition
law; instead, they opined in dicta that under trademark law that CocaCola had an exclusive right to the designation Coke as an
abbreviation of its COCA-COLA mark despite its failure to use the
107
designation as a trademark.
Finally, in Coca-Cola v. Busch, the court found that the
defendant’s use of the mark KOKE-UP would deceive the public.
For the first time, a court explicitly noted that the nickname Coke was
given to the product solely by the public and had not yet been
108
appropriated by the Coca-Cola Co. The court started its analysis
stating that the precedent was “rather few and on the whole not
109
altogether satisfactory.” The Busch court looked to three English
cases, which at least from the court’s abbreviated summaries of them
110
do not appear to be directly on point. The court then observed
“[t]he American cases are few in number and some while seemingly
opposed to the view here adopted, upon careful examination, review
111
The three
no inconsistency with the position here taken.”
American cases that the court relied on seemed to focus almost
entirely on questions of secondary meaning or unfair competition.
The Busch court then explicitly held without explaining its
justification for extending existing law on what the court
acknowledged was a problematic precedent that “the abbreviation of
the trade-mark which the public has used and adopted as designating
the product of the complaint is equally as much to be protected as the
112
trademark itself,” and under the common law, there would be no
trademark infringement and that remedy, if any, would be due to the
113
principles of unfair competition.

105. Coca-Cola Co. v. Christopher, 37 F. Supp. 216 (E.D. Mich. 1941).
106. Coca-Cola Co. v. Busch, 44 F. Supp. 405, 408 (D. Pa. 1942).
107. Id.
108. Brody, supra note 80, at 1129.
109. Busch, 44 F. Supp. 408.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 409.
112. Id. at 410.
113. See Id. at 407; see also id. at 411 (“the proof clearly indicates the intention to
palm off the defendant's product as that of the plaintiff, and it seems to me to permit the
defendant to so do would be unconscionable and would be lending the weight of a court of
equity to a deceptive matter”).
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Significantly, none of the Coca-Cola cases address the fact that
Coca-Cola attempted to discourage the use of the designation Coke
114
by the public when referring to its product. It was not until 1941
when the designation Coke was so well established in the minds of the
consuming public that Coca-Cola formally began to appropriate the
115
Arguably, by discouraging
Coke designation as a trademark.
consumer use, Coca-Cola abandoned whatever rights it may have
possessed in the mark as bestowed by the public and Coca-Cola’s
trademark rights affirmatively began when it commenced using the
116
COKE mark in June 1941. However, these interesting issues were
not litigated, or at least played no role in the different published
117
opinions.
The public use doctrine sat quietly in an inchoate form for
another thirty-five years. Starting in the late 1960s, Volkswagen
litigated a series of cases involving the public’s designation of Bug to
118
Because it
refer to the iconic Volkswagen Beetle automobile.
resembled a ladybug or a beetle, the American public quickly applied
the designation Bug to the Volkswagen Beetle automobile after its
initial importation into the United States. Volkswagen itself did not
initially appropriate the designation Bug; however, independent
Volkswagen automobile dealers used the Bug designation in
119
advertisements and in dealership trade names. This limited use by
Volkswagen dealers was not legally significant as a trademark use in
commerce. Under the court interpretations of trademark law in
effect at the time, the mark had to be affixed to the goods so a
Volkswagen dealer’s use of the Bug designation would be sufficient to
support a claim of unfair competition, but not to create positive
120
trademark rights in the designation as a trademark for automobiles.
Furthermore, there was no discussion in the cases regarding whether
these commercial uses by Volkswagen and its dealers were sufficient

114. Brody, supra note 73, at 1130.
115. Id. at 1131.
116. Id.
at 1130-31.
Arguably, Coca-Cola’s counter advertising constituted
abandonment of the designation Coke or at least whatever theoretical rights that the
public had created in designation as a mark for Coca-Cola. Cf. Beech-Nut Packing Co. v.
P. Lorillard Co., 273 U.S. 629, 632 (1927); See also Russell V. Caroline-Becker, Inc., 142
N.E.2d 899, 902 (Mass. 1957); McCarthy, supra note 97 at 17:3.
117. Brody, supra note 80, at 1131.
118. Id. at 1132-37.
119. Id. at 1133.
120. Id. at 1133 n. 45.
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to create rights in the Bug designation as a service mark for
121
Volkswagen dealers or Volkswagen automobile repair services.
While the trial court’s opinion in Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Rickard contained an extensive discussion of
secondary meaning and the factual basis for the strong commercial
122
strength of the Bug designation,
secondary meaning, even
extraordinarily strongly acquired commercial secondary meaning, is
merely one element to determine whether a designation may
constitute a legally protectable mark and is not dispositive on the
question of who actually owns the mark. The court did not engage in
the analysis necessary to support a finding that absent commercial use
by Volkswagen, the designation Bug was indeed a protected
trademark owned by Volkswagen.
Moreover, it is unclear under which section of the Lanham Act or
other law Volkswagen brought its trademark claims for infringement
of its unregistered trademarks. The trial court opined that it had
jurisdiction under section 32(1) of the Lanham Act, which protects
only federal registered trademarks, and also under United States
(Paris Convention) treaty obligations to protect a foreign national
123
against unfair competition. But it is unclear on which section of the
Lanham Act (or other federal law) that the court relied on to reach
the issue of the Bug designation, because the trial court failed to cite
to section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which protects unregistered
marks as a claim, or to state an alternative basis on which the court
124
asserted jurisdiction.
On appeal, the circuit court succinctly summarized the trial
court’s analysis:
The district court specifically found that ‘prior to defendant’s
commencement of business under the trade name ‘The Bug
Shop’, ‘Bug’ had acquired a strong secondary meaning in the
automotive field referring to plaintiff and the products and
services marketed in the United States through the
Volkswagen organization.’ The secondary meaning doctrine

121. Id.
122. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Rickard, 175 U.S.P.Q. 563, 565. (N.D.
Tex. 1972), modified and aff’d, 492 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1974).
123. But see In re Rath, 402 F.3d 1207, 1209-10 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding the Paris
Convention is not a self-executing treaty).
124. A reasonable reading of the case and by a simple process of elimination suggests
that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act was indeed the alternative basis for the court’s
jurisdiction.
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referred to by the court holds that words which have a
primary meaning of their own, such as bug, may by long used
in connection with a particular product, come to be known by
the public as specifically designating that product. Thus in the
judgment of the trial court, the word ‘bug’ as used in the
automotive field had become so associated with the
Volkswagen that [Volkswagen] was entitled to trademark
125
rights in the word.
The appellate court did briefly mention the use of the designation
126
Bug in Volkswagen’s own advertisements for many years.
However, as the quotation shows, there was no detailed discussion of
Volkswagen’s use or appropriation of the designation Bug. One may
assume that whatever Volkswagen’s actual use in commerce was, that
use may have been sufficient commercial use to appropriate the
designation.
Perhaps the best case supporting the public use doctrine in the
Volkswagen Bug line of cases is Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v.
127
Hoffman involves another independent repair service
Hoffman.
using the designation Bug to identify its business of servicing
Volkswagen sedans. Hoffman is distinguishable from prior cases
because by this point in time Volkswagen had registered BUG as a
128
service mark However, Hoffman’s use of the mark BUG predated
Volkswagen’s service mark registration. The court had to determine
whether under the senior user defense Volkswagen had developed
129
common law trademark rights in the BUG mark. The court then
discussed Volkswagen’s massive advertising use of the designation
Bug and found that the term had acquired secondary meaning to
designate the Volkswagen Beetle sedan prior to Hoffman’s first use in
commerce of the term BUG.
In what is arguably the first clear modern (post-Lanham Act)
articulation of the public use doctrine, the Hoffman court stated, “[a]
word can also develop secondary meaning by public usage of the
word to designate a particular product. Thus, a nickname for a

125. Rickard, 492 F.2d at 477 (internal citations omitted).
126. Id. at 478.
127. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Hoffman, 489 F. Supp. 678 (D.S.C.
1980).
128. Id. at 681.
th
129. See Id. at 681-82. Cf. GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 541 (10 Cir.
1990)(Tea Rose-Rectanus Senior User Defense). See also Lanham Act §33(b)(5), 15
U.S.C. §1115(b)(5) (2006).
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product is protectable as a trademark if the owner of the product
130
adopts it or allows the public to use it without protest.” The first
part of the quote is a mere restatement of a well-established black
letter law principle that public use can create secondary meaning. It
is black letter law that the secondary meaning is measured from the
131
However, the second part
perspective of the consuming public.
conflates two distinct seminal trademark concepts: the requirement of
132
secondary meaning and the requirement of its use in commerce.
The court did not address the issues of appropriation or use of the
public’s designation by the entity claiming the public designation. To
properly complete its analysis, the court would have needed to
demonstrate in its legal analysis that the public’s use is legally a use in
commerce that was sufficiently used to convey trademark rights to a
private entity.
Hoffman is nuanced in that the court recognized that if a business
attempts to discourage the public’s use of the designation, then that
business should not later be able to claim the designation based on
133
the public’s prior use of the designation. However, in the published
opinion the legal basis for this conclusion is unclear. At the very
least, a court may reach this position either on the grounds that the
entity claiming the mark had abandoned any possible legal claim to
the mark or, in the alternative, on principles of estoppel and equity
134
practice. Justice and equity will not reward a party for taking the
135
The maxim of
position of the proverbial dog in a manger.
trademark law is “use it or lose it.” However, because the purpose of
unfair competition law is broader than that of trademark law, it is
unclear whether this rule should apply to claims of unfair
136
competition. The goal of the law of unfair competition is more than
130. Hoffman, 489 F. Supp. at 681. The Lanham Act was enacted July 6, 1946, and
Coca-Cola Co. v. Busch, 44 F. Supp. 405, 408 (D. Pa. 1942) is a 1942 case.
131. McCarthy, supra note 83 at 15:5.
132. See Int’l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe Des Bains De Mer et Du Cercle des Estrangers
A Monaco, 329 F.3d. 359, 363-64 (4th Cir. 2003).
133. Hoffman, 489 F. Supp. at 681; see also George & Co, LLC v. Imagination
Entm’t Lt’d., 575 F.3d 383, 404 (4th Cir. 2009).
134. See Brody, supra note 80, at 1135-36.
135. See Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Garner, 6 Abb. Pr. N. S. 265, 270 (1869)(“This is a
sort of a dog in the manger policy, which courts of equity will not enforce. Corporations
and vast monopolies must be protected in their legal and well ascertained rights, but it is
not incumbent upon courts of equity to prevent others from doing what corporations and
monopolies have failed to do, and do not do, simply because they prefer not to do it.”);
Gilliam v. Quinlan, 608 F. Supp. 823, 829 n. 3(D.C.N.Y 1985).
136. See 1 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:7 (4th ed.);
see also MCCARTHY §§ 1:8-9.
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the mere protection of the goodwill of a single company or the
prevention of consumer deception. Rather, the goal of unfair
competition law is the protection of the integrity of the marketplace
137
and its participants.
The next line of cases involved the designation Hog to refer to
Harley-Davidson motorcycles. Like Coca-Cola, Harley-Davidson
had initially discouraged the use of a publicly coined designation, in
138
this case the Hog public designation. In the first case discussing the
designation Hog, Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Seghieri, the court stated,
“Plaintiff contends that since at least the early 1950’s, the public has
referred to Harley-Davidson motorcycles, and no other brand of
139
motorcycles, as ‘Hogs.’”
However, the court recounts a more
specific factual statement:
The “HOG” trademark was first registered in April of 1988
and was first used in conjunction with motorcycle parts in
1986. Prior to 1986, the “HOG” designation was used in
conjunction with a variety of items, including clocks, watches,
jewelry, ashtrays, belt buckles, greeting cards, posters and
140
letters, beginning in 1983.
The defendant’s first use of the HOG FARM mark in commerce
141
occurred in 1986. So, it is not clear that the court’s conclusion relied
142
on the public’s use of the Hog designation. A closer reading of
Seghieri suggests that the mention of the public’s use of the
designation Hog related to whether the designation Hog had become
generic and not to the basis on which to find the use of the
designation as constituting trademark appropriation.

137. Id. at §§ 1:8-9. But see Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., Inc. 695 F.2d
96, 103-04 (5th Cir. 1982)(rejecting an unfair competition claim involving an abandoned
mark with significant commercial residual goodwill).
138. See Brody, supra note 80, at 1138.
139. Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Seghieri, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1956, 1957 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1958. (“Plaintiff has clearly established prior use of the mark -- prior both
to its own registration of the mark and prior to Defendants’ use of the mark. Although it
is true that Defendants’ business was established prior to Plaintiff’s registration of the
name “HOG”, the evidence establishes that it was Plaintiff who established prior use of
the term “hog”, both nationally and locally in San Jose, California.”).
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Unlike the Coca-Cola cases, at least one court has found that the
143
designation Hog had become generic for a type of large motorcycle.
In Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, the court found that the
144
Harleydesignation Hog was generic for large motorcycles.
Davidson attempted to rely on the public’s use of the designation
Hog to refer to Harley-Davidson motorcycles prior to its adoption of
the designation Hog, in order to achieve an earlier priority date based
on the public’s use first use as a designation in commerce. The
Grottanelli court cited to National Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v.
145
(mark “ACE”), and
American Cinema Editors, Inc.
146
(mark “BUG”) for the
Volkswagenwerk AG v. Hoffman
proposition that the public’s use of a designation may “accord a
147
company priority as to its subsequent trademark use of a term.”
The Grottanelli court declined to opine on this issue, holding that
“[t]he public has no more right than a manufacturer to withdraw from
the language a generic term, already applicable to the relevant
category of products, and accord it trademark significance, at least as
148
long as the term retains some generic meaning.” So, with a wink to
the cases recognizing the public’s use of the designation as granting
trademark rights, the court declined the apply these cases and
resolved the dispute largely on the separate issue of genericism.
Finally, in 1999, a federal appellate court recognized the public
149
use doctrine in the context of a trademark infringement action. In
Johnny Blastoff, Inc. v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co., the court was
150
called upon to determine who owned the mark ST. LOUIS RAMS.
The defendant, the Los Angeles Rams football team, sought to
relocate to St. Louis, Missouri in pursuit of playing in a better climate.
The sports media was abuzz with stories regarding the relocation of
the team. Though the move was announced in January 1995, the
Rams did not begin to use the mark ST. LOUIS RAMS in commerce
151
until April 1995. As the Los Angeles Rams prepared to use the St.
143. Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.2d. 806, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1999), but
see Seghieri, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1957 (finding that trademark HOG was not generic).
144. Grottanelli, 164 F.2d. at 810-11.
145. Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n, Inc. v. American Cinema Editors, Inc., 937 F.2d
1572 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
146. Hoffman, 489 F. Supp.at 678.
147. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d at 812.
148. Id. at 812.
149. Brody, supra note 80, at 1140 (citing Johnny Blastoff, Inc. v. Los Angeles Rams
Football Co., 188 F.3d 427 (7th Cir. 1999)).
150. Johnny Blastoff, Inc., 188 F.3d at 431.
151. Id. at 430.
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Louis Rams designation as their new trademark, the plaintiff, Johnny
Blastoff, Inc., a business engaged in creating and marketing cartoons,
filed for and received a Wisconsin trademark registration in February
1995 for ST. LOUIS RAMS, and then filed an intent-to-use
application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office one
152
month later.
The question before the Johnny Blastoff court was when the
Rams football franchise acquired a protectable interest in the
disputed ST. LOUIS RAMS trademark. The court stated “[f]or the
purpose of establishing public identification of a mark with a product
or service, the fact-finder may rely on the use of the mark in
“advertising brochures, catalogs, newspaper ads, and articles in
newspapers and trade publications, as well as in media outlets such as
153
television and radio.” The court then went on to state:
In addition, courts have recognized that ‘abbreviations and
nicknames of trademarks or names used only by the public
give rise to protectable rights in the owners of the trade name
or mark which the public modified.’ Such public use of a mark
154
is deemed to be on behalf of the mark’s owners.
Tellingly, the Federal Circuit case to which the Johnny Blastoff
court cited was an appeal from a trademark cancellation decision of
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. In response to the
appellant-registrant’s objection that the party opposing the trademark
registration (“opposer”) had not shown sufficient use to have rights to
oppose the registration of the mark, the Federal Circuit stated “[i]t is
not required that [the opposer] meet the technical statutory
requirements to register [a] mark . . . in order for [the opposer] to
155
have a basis for objection to another’s registration.” So the case
that merely stands for the proposition that public use of a designation
may grant grounds that provide standing to oppose a trademark
registration.

152. Id.
153. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
154. Id. (quoting Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n. v. Am. Cinema Editors, Inc., 937
F.2d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1991))(emphasis in original). Cf. 3 MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18:52 (4th ed.) (trademark use by licensees
that creates goodwill inures to the benefit of the trademark holder).
155. Nat’l Cable Television Ass’n v. American Cinema Editors, Inc. 937 F.2d 1572,
1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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Standing in trademark law in an administrative proceeding is not
the same as Article III case or controversy standing under the
156
Constitution. Standing to oppose a trademark registration merely
requires that the party has a real interest in the proceedings and that
the party possess a reasonable belief that it may be damaged by the
157
trademark registration. It is not the same as standing under Article
158
III of the Constitution. The burden is much lower. The party is not
required to have a specific commercial interest, not shared by the
159
general public. In Ritchie v. Orenthal James Simpson, the court held
that Mr. Ritchie’s interest in a “belief in a loving and nurturing
relationship between husband and wife and the allegation that the
[OJ SIMPSON] marks are synonymous with wife-beater and wifemurder” was sufficient to confer standing on him to oppose a
160
trademark registration. The second element is a reasonable belief
161
that the registration would damage the opposing party. One way of
showing that a party has a reasonable belief that it would be damaged
is by showing that it possesses a relevant trait or characteristic that is
162
implicated by the proposed trademark.
The holders of referentmarks will possess all the rights of the general public to prevent the
registration of confusingly similar marks as well as having a specific
commercial interest in the specific trademark registration.
Furthermore, since the holders possess a relevant characteristic, the
potential registration of the designation may affect the economic
value of their mark.
The Johnny Blastoff court, without analysis or even
acknowledging the distinction between the right to oppose a
trademark registration or petition for cancellation and the positive
trademark rights in the mark, extended this narrow holding. This
holding on a technical question of trademark prosecution was then
used to create support for a novel extension of trademark law that a
use by the public creates positive trademark rights, and the public’s
non-commercial use inures to the benefit of the referent-mark holder
as if it were an actual use in commerce.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

170 F.3d 1092, 1094-95 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1096-97.
Id. at 1097.
Id. at 1097-98.
Id. at 1098.
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Moreover, it is unclear whether the Johnny Blastoff court needed
to reach any of these issues. Disregarding the public use doctrine, the
use of the mark RAMS in connection with any sporting goods or
associated consumer products still would have probably caused a
163
likelihood of consumer confusion. Under the trademark doctrine of
tacking, a mark owner can assert rights in a new mark with the same
commercial impression based on its first use in commerce of a prior
164
mark. The focus of the commercial impression of the marks LOS
ANGELES RAMS and ST. LOUIS RAMS is on the word RAMS, so
165
this would be an excellent case for the court to find tacking.
Alternatively, the court could have rested its decision regarding
senior user rights based on the Rams’s own offering for sale of season
166
tickets that predated Blastoff’s first use of the mark in commerce.
So while the language of the Johnny Blastoff case is strongly
encouraging for proponents of the Public use doctrine, it does not
provide the rigorous analysis that is required to place a public use
right on solid doctrinal footing and to justify disregarding common
law and Lanham Act requirements of a use in commerce as an
essential element for trademark ownership.
Perhaps the best case supporting the public use doctrine in the
context of a trademark infringement action is George & Co., LLC v.
167
In George & Co., plaintiff
Imagination Entertainment Ltd.
attempted to use the Public use doctrine as a defense against
168
George & Co. court grudgingly
trademark abandonment.
recognized a narrow definition of the marks eligible for protection
under the Public use doctrine. “The Public use doctrine, which is
extremely limited in scope, states that abbreviations or nicknames
used only by the public can give rise to protectable trademark rights

163. See Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Baltimore Football Club Ltd., 34 F.3d 410,
413 (7th Cir. 1994).
164. See Data Concepts, Inc. v. Digital Consulting, Inc., 150 F.3d 620, 623 (6th Cir.
1998) (“The use of an earlier mark can be tacked onto the use of a subsequent mark only
if the previously used mark is “the legal equivalent of the mark in question or
indistinguishable therefrom” such that consumers “consider both as the same mark.”).
165. For example, the Rams franchise disclaimed the use of “St. Louis” apart from
the word mark “ST. LOUIS RAMS.” See Registration No. 3256433, available at
http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=4005:jb2n0.2.1. They also disclaimed
“Los Angeles” except as part of the “LOS ANGELES RAMS.” See Registration No.
0971047, available at http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/showfield?f=doc&state=4005:jb2n0.9.13.
166. See Johnny Blastoff, Inc., 188 F.3d at 431-32 (by early February 1995, over 72,000
season tickets were sold).
167. George & Co., LLC v. Imagination Entm’t Ltd., 575 F.3d 383 (4th Cir. 2009).
168. Id. at 403.

GIBBONS_PRODUCTION_FINAL_2.DOCX

2012

CROWDSOURCING A TRADEMARK

65

to the owner of a mark which the public has modified.” 169 The word
“nickname” could be read broadly enough to encompass entirely new
names, such as the designation Mickey D for McDonalds or Tarzhay
for Target. However, the examples given by the court are all
confusingly similar abbreviations such as BUD for BUDWEISER or
170
This suggests that the preferred
COKE for COCA-COLA.
interpretation of the term “nickname” is narrower interpretation, and
perhaps, that the George & Co. court was only prepared to
recognized abbreviations that were in themselves colorable imitations
of the referent-mark holder’s mark. The court also noted that the
Public use doctrine had been used in the franchise context citing the
Johnny Blastoff, Inc. case. As discussed earlier in this Article, in the
context of the Johnny Blastoff, Inc. case the George & Co. court also
relied on was the Federal Circuit’s National Cable Television case,
which considered only the public’s use of a designation as a ground
that established standing for filing an opposition to trademark
registration and not as an affirmative ground on which to create new
171
trademark rights.
The George & Co. court limited the public use doctrine to wellknown brands. Significantly for this article, the court held that the
doctrine was limited only to an abbreviation or shortening of the
172
mark and did not apply to elongations of a mark. So, starting from
COCA-COLA, the public may create the mark COKE under the
public use doctrine. But the public could not create a protectable
COCA-COLA designation starting from the COKE mark. This antielongation rule was not based on citation to legal authority. Rather,
it was based on an exiguous discussion of how the court viewed the
use of designations and trademarks by consumers in the
173
marketplace. Second, the court held that “the Public use doctrine
does not provide trademark protection where the owner of the mark
174
fails to continue to use the mark.” For this proposition, the court
relied on Grottanelli, where Harley-Davidson deliberately resisted

169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Part II.A.1 & Part III.
172. George & Co, LLC., 575 F.3d at 403-04.
173. Id. (“Coke and Bud clearly add distinctiveness to their respective marks. In
contrast, an elongation does not add distinctiveness to a mark. “Peanut Butter & Jelly”
certainly does not make “PB & J” more distinctive. The same can be said of “Bacon,
Lettuce, and Tomato” and “BLT.””).
174. Id. at 404.
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linking the designation Hog to its products. 175 So even a court that
was prepared to accept public use as a sufficient use to award a
protectable interest in a designation required that the referent-mark
holder must use the mark. However, in the hypothetical case
analyzed in this Article, the referent-mark holder is attempting to
assert rights in a mark that it, itself, had never used.
The era of public designations percolating among consumers or
the media for years, decades, or generations before appropriation by
a competitor is gone. Crowd-sourced designations will suddenly
appear and will need to be protected quickly. From a reading of the
case law, trademark holders may find that the public use doctrine is
weakly moored in readily distinguishable cases or in mere dicta,
which may either not be followed, or if followed, future courts may
decline to extend the doctrine.
The penumbras of the case law
suggest that discouraging the use of a public designation weakens the
referent-mark holder’s ability to protect the public designation, that
failure to adopt it may also result in the limitation or loss of rights,
and that the scope of which public designations are eligible for the
application of the doctrine is also unclear. Assuming that the public
use doctrine does exist, as the law currently stands, it provides an
uncertain foundation on which to build a brand or mark, if, as this
article posits, the public will be an increasingly significant source for
valuable trademarks.
2.

Public use doctrine elements

The elements of the public use doctrine, as articulated in George
& Co., require that the party claiming its protection to have a wellknown mark which the public has modified into a shortened
176
nickname or abbreviation. Public use doctrine may be limited only
to well-known marks—in fact limited to marks, which border on the
famous. As demonstrated earlier in this section, the public use
doctrine, while a sound doctrine as a prudential matter, has a
questionable provenance in trademark law. The only court to
explicitly recognize the public use doctrine in the trademark
infringement context stated:
Although the [p]ublic use doctrine appears at odds with the
bedrock trademark principles that ownership rights flow only
from the prior appropriation and actual use in the market

175. Id.
176. Id. at 403.
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superior rights are granted to the owner of the mark as
modified by the public to avoid consumer confusion in the
market-place. Because of this tension, the [p]ublic use
doctrine generally is confined to instances where the public
modified a well-known brand into a nickname or
177
abbreviation.
If the public use doctrine does exist in trademark law and it is a
valid exception to the general law of trademarks that requires
ownership through appropriation and commercial use, then, at best,
the public use doctrine is an extremely precarious basis on which to
claim trademark rights for marks that are arguably at least wellknown, if not in fact legally famous and protected against trademark
dilution.
So far, the public use doctrine has been limited to well-known
178
The public use doctrine case law revolves around
marks.
designations such as Coke, Bug, and Hog for Cola-Cola, Volkswagen,
and Harley-Davidson respectively—some of the most prestigious,
recognized, and valuable brands in the world—famous brands. The
extremely limited public use doctrine case law is not clear on what
constitutes a well-known mark for the purposes of the public use
doctrine or when a referent-mark has sufficiently achieved such
renown to earn the status of being a well-known mark for the purpose
of protection against a competitor’s appropriation of a publicly
coined designation. Therefore, it may be useful to consider other
uses of the term well-known mark in trademark law.
Well-known mark is a term of art in trademark law. The term
well-known mark appears in the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property (the “Paris Convention”) and the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the
179
Unfortunately, some courts also
“TRIPS Agreement”).
erroneously use the term well-known mark as a synonym for—or

177. Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The court then went on to
hold that the public use doctrine did not apply to elongations of a mark merely to
abbreviations or nicknames.
178. Id.
179. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Art. 6 bis, March 20,
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305; Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), art. 16(2), 1869 U.N.T.S., 33 I.L.M. (1994); Grupo
Gigante S.A. De C.V. v. Dallo & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2004). See
also Leah Chan Grinvald, A Tale of Two Theories of Well-Known Marks, 13 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 29 (2010).
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interchangeably with—the trademark term famous-mark. 180
Consequently, the existing case law and scholarly commentary is in
some state of rhetorical confusion. As will be discussed later in the
Article, if the public designation cases are analyzed under modern
trademark dilution theory, there is no need for a separate public use
181
doctrine.
This section will limit its discussion of well-known marks to the
term’s commonly understood meaning under trademark law. Under
the Paris Convention and the TRIPS Agreement, WTO countries are
required to protect well-known marks, even if that mark is not
182
registered or used in that country. This scope of trademark rights
for well-known marks seems roughly analogous to the scope of the
Public use doctrine where the public designation is protected without
use by the merchant claiming rights in the mark in order to protect
183
the public interest against a likelihood of consumer confusion.
In ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit commended the “Joint Recommendation
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well–Known Marks”
adopted by World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to the
attention of New York State’s highest court in its certification of a
184
question to the New York State Court of Appeals. The WIPO Joint
Recommendation requires the consideration of the following six
factors:
(1) the degree of knowledge or recognition of the mark in the
relevant sector of the public;

180. See ITC Ltd. v. Punchgini, Inc., 9 N.Y.3d 467, 474 n. 1 (2007).
181. See Part IV. Also, even if the referent-holder’s marks are merely well known,
they are strong marks and courts have held that “the stronger the mark, the more likely it
is that encroachment on it will produce confusion.” See 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS
§ 24:49 (quoting Champions Golf Club v. Champions Golf Clubs, 78 F.3d 111 (6th Cir.
1996)).
182. Paris Convention, Art. 6 bis; TRIPS Art. 16(2); Grupo Gigante SA De CV, 391
F.3d at 1099-1100. See also Leah Chan Grinvald, at 29.
183. Compare generally 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 29:62 (4th ed.) with McCarthy, supra note 97 at § 7:18.
184. Punchgini Inc., 482 F.3d at 168-69. The WIPO Joint Recommendation is
authoritative because it “has been adopted by both intergovernmental bodies concerned
with trademark protection: the General Assembly of the World Intellectual Property
Organization (“WIPO”) and the Assembly of the Paris Union.” See Empresa Cubana del
Tabaco v. Culbro Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4935 at *101 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2004),
rev’d on other grounds, 399 F.3d 462 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1205 (2006).

GIBBONS_PRODUCTION_FINAL_2.DOCX

2012

CROWDSOURCING A TRADEMARK

69

(2) the duration, extent and geographical area of any use of the
mark;
(3) the duration, extent and geographical area of any promotion
of the mark, including advertising or publicity and the presentation, at
fairs or exhibitions, or the goods and/or services to which the mark
applies;
(4) the duration and geographical area of any registrations, and/or
any application for registration, of the mark, to the extent that they
reflect use or recognition of the mark;
(5) the record of successful enforcement of rights in the mark, in
particular, the extent to which the mark was recognized as well
known by competent authorities; [and]
185
(6) the value associated with the mark.
The WIPO Joint Recommendation factors are consistent with the
case law underlying the public use doctrine that implicitly requires a
court to weigh the first-in-time, first-in-right principle of trademark
appropriation against the need to prevent the likelihood of consumer
confusion. It also requires a finding that the mark has renown and
significant commercial value before the scale tips in favor of
departing from the historical and legal moorings of trademark law.
Taking the court at its word that only well-known marks are
protected by the public use doctrine, one may speculate either that
the public use doctrine is a judicially crafted common law doctrine
that provided de facto protection to famous (and niche fame) marks
prior to the formal amendment of the Lanham Act to protect famous
186
marks against infringement by dilution, or on the spectrum of fame,
it provides quasi-trademark dilution protection for the almost famous
mark or soon to be famous mark that does not yet meet the test for
187
fame under section 43(c) of the Lanham Act. “[U]nderstood as an
expression of the strength and fame of the underlying brand, a
publicly-coined nickname logically belong[s] to the party that built
that strong famous brand, for were it not for the brand owner’s
efforts, there would have been no occasion for the nickname to
185. Punchgini Inc., 482 F.3d at 168-69 (quoting World Intellectual Property
Organization [WIPO], Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of
Well–Known Marks. WIPO Doc. 833(E), art. 2(3)(i) (Sept. 1999).
186. The vast majority of Public use doctrine cases predate both The Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 and The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006. See
generally Brody, supra note 73 (discussing the cases that coalesced into the pulic use
doctrine).
187. See infra Part IV, discussing trademark dilution.

70

HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.

35:1

arise.” 188 If this is true as the justification for the public use doctrine,
then because federal law now recognizes trademark dilution, the only
remaining statutory or common law justification for the public use
doctrine is the protection of consumers from the likelihood of
consumer confusion. In either case, while the public use doctrine may
have some potential for a well-known national brand, it likely
provides little or no potential to support a claim by a local or regional
brand to a public designation.
As the doctrine is currently
articulated, there is no reason that a court could not use it to protect
the almost-famous or the niche-fame marks which are currently not
189
protected under the TDRA. From the perspective of the referentmark holder, this may appear to be a good trademark policy
justification. However, the creation of a new class of “almost
famous” marks would conflict with the TDRA, and it may also
conflict with state laws protecting distinctive marks from trademark
dilution.
3.

Summary of public use doctrine

The public use doctrine is well intentioned and clearly protects
the public’s interest against consumer confusion, so as a matter of
policy it may be a wise choice—but it is just that, a choice, and one
that is not dictated out of expediency or the lack of other remedies.
Unfair competition law also achieves the same result without doing
190
needless damage to a fundamental principle of trademark law. As
was demonstrated earlier in this section of the article, the public use
doctrine is based on a weak doctrinal flooring, ambiguous or readily
distinguishable case law, and clearly conflicts with a well-established
principle of trademark law that states trademark rights arise only
through appropriation by use and not by the mere adoption of the
mark.
The case law cited in support of the public use doctrine frequently
focused on whether the public use had given the mark secondary
meaning. Secondary meaning is merely the element of mark
ownership that shows the designation is capable of serving as a mark.
Just because a designation is legally capable of functioning as a mark
does not mean either the designation is a mark or that the designation
has been appropriated as a mark. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Hunting World, Inc. established a spectrum of distinctiveness for

188. See also Brody, supra note 80, at 1153.
189. See Part IV.
190. See Part V.A.
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trademark and their eligibility for trademark protection without a
191
There are three classes of
showing of secondary meaning.
trademarks—arbitrary, fanciful, and suggestive marks—that are
technical trademarks and are legally presumed to be inherently
distinctive and do not require separate proof of sescondary
192
meaning.
Yet, even though these three classes of marks are immediately
legally protectable upon bona fide use in commerce, the mark must
first be used in commerce before the trademark user has ownership of
the mark. The two cases that impute the public’s use of the
designation as a commercial use by the referent-mark holder have not
articulated any legal basis for this conclusion and for departing from
over a century of statutory and common law. The public is not the
referent-mark holder’s agent, and there is no legal relationship
between the two. This is a major failing of the public use doctrine. It
protects a public designation as mark and grants trademark rights to
the referent-mark holder without actual use by the party claiming
ownership of the designation. Until the public use doctrine is more
robustly theorized and moored in a well-reasoned and wellarticulated body of case law, the public use doctrine remains at best
the last arrow in the quiver of a negligent mark holder seeking
protection from a competitor’s first appropriation of the mark.
Like the ownership of the fox in Pierson v. Post, hunting is not
enough, pursuit is not enough, even wounding is not enough, the fox
must actually be taken before the hunter obtains a property
193
interest. In the public use doctrine cases, the hunter is not even
chasing the fox, the hunter is watching the fox frolic in the woods, or
is even oblivious to its existence until another hunter attempts to take
possession of the fox. Here, the passive enjoyment of the publicly
coined designation is not enough, the referent-mark holder must seize
the mark from its status as a designation in the public domain through
bona fide use in commerce. Until the mark is appropriated,
interlopers like the second hunter in Post may be able to obtain a
property interest in the mark, if they appropriate it first. While the
hunt without capture may be insufficient to convey trademark rights,
it may be sufficient under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act’s broad
prohibition on many types of unfair competition, to convey standing

191. Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9-11 (2nd Cir.
1976).
192. Id.
193. See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
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to allege claims that protect the public’s interest. In other words, the
referent-mark holder may not own the designation, but it may have
rights to prevent others from using the designation, if that use
constitutes some form of unfair competition.

IV. Trademark Prosecution
This section will explore how public designations have been used
as part of the trademark prosecution process. Applications may be
194
filed under several different sections of the Lanham Act. Section
1(a) of the Lanham Act allows a party actually using the mark to file
an application for a trademark registration. Section 1(a) is textually
ambiguous because it uses the phrase “the owner of a mark used in
commerce,” but it does not explicitly require the owner to have been
195
the party actually using the mark. However, interpreting section
1(a) in light of the case law and the language in section 1(b), the
intent to use provision, it is clear that the section 1(a) applicant must
be the party to actually use the mark in bona fide interstate
196
commerce. However, merely because the public’s use is insufficient
to create trademark registration rights under section 1(a), the public’s
independent use of a designation may be an adequate basis on which
to oppose the registration of the mark by a competitor, or to support
cancellation of a registered mark under section 2(d) of the Lanham
197
Act.
Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act permits the opposition to— or
cancelation of— a mark that:
[c]onsists of or comprises a mark which so resembles a mark
registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or

194. LARS S. SMITH & LLEWELLYN JOSEPH GIBBONS, MASTERING TRADEMARK
LAW, Carolina Academic Press (forthcoming 2012).
195. See Brody, supra note 73 at 1142. This is also reflected in the language of the
Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP). See TMEP § 901.05 (5th ed. Sept.
2007) (use by related company) and TMEP § 903.05 (5th ed. Sept. 2007) (use by
predecessor in title).
196. See Brody, supra note 80, at 1142. The problem with this argument is that section
1(b) was added to the 1946 Lanham Act (Pub. L. 79-489) in 1988. So, it is not clear that
section 1(b) is a clear statement of Congress’ intent in enacting 1(a) in 1946. However, the
canons of statutory interpretation require that the two be read in pari materia and
construed harmoniously. See SMITH AND GIBBONS, supra note 194. Cf. Dastar Corp. v.
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34-5 (2003)(using the 1990 Visual Artists
Rights Act to interpret the scope of the meaning of the term “origin” as used in the 1946
Lanham Act).
197. See MCCARTHY, supra note 97 at § 7:18.
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trade name previously used in the United States by another
and not abandoned, as to be likely, when used on or in
connection with the goods of the applicant, to cause
198
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.
The plain language of section 2(d) requires that the basis of the
opposition or cancellation be the use of the designation as a mark by
the party opposing the registration or petitioning for the cancellation
of the trademark registration. The opposer or petitioner must
support their claim to the mark based on their own use of the mark
199
and may not rely on third-party uses to make their case. If thirdparty trademark use is insufficient to make a prima facie case under
section 2(d), then the public’s non-commercial use of a designation
should also be irrelevant to an opposition or petition under the
200
Lanham Act.
Despite the black letter law regarding standing and trademark
registration requirements, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(“TTAB”) and the Federal Circuit have considered publicly created
designations and the public’s use of such designations in trademark
201
registration cases. The first decision involving public designations
was Peiper v. Playboy Enterprises, Inc., and involved the mark
202
BUNNY CLUB.
The TTAB found that although Playboy
Enterprises itself had not used the mark BUNNY CLUB prior to the
petitioner, it had used the bunny symbol on its products and the word
“Bunnies” to describe the attractive, scantly-costumed female staff
working in its Clubs. Moreover, newspapers referred to the Playboy
Clubs as “Bunny Clubs.” The TTAB found that the goodwill in the
BUNNY CLUB mark resided in Playboy Enterprises. However, the
TTAB actually rested its decision on the grounds that Playboy had
used the bunny symbol on numerous products, albeit not in
association with the services offered by Playboy Clubs.
In addition to the trademark infringement litigation cases
discussed previously, Volkswagen also had a line of trademark
203
prosecution cases involving the mark BUG. Volkswagen opposed
the registration for BUG COOLER for an automobile engine cooling
198. Lanham Act §2(d), 15 U.S.C.§1126(e) (2006); see Brody, supra note 80, at 1143.
199. See Brody, supra note 80, at 1143.
200. Id. See also Fossil Inc. v. Fossil Group, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1451 (T.T.A.B.
1998)(opposer must be a prior user).
201. See Brody, supra note 80, at 1143.
202. Peiper v. Playboy Enter. Inc., 179 U.S.P.Q. 318 (T.T.A.B. 1979).
203. See Part II.C.1
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system. 204 The TTAB found that there was extensive use of the
designation Bug by Volkswagen in advertisements, for a rental car
service, and in motion pictures such as the “Love Bug.” The TTAB
then concluded:
The record clearly shows that opposer has acquired a right in
the term “BUG” with regard to the automotive field. The
word “BUG” having been used by the public to denominate
opposer’s automobiles, opposer is protected therein even
though it has never used the designation Bug as a mark on
205
automobiles.
Here, there was extensive use of the mark BUG by Volkswagen.
Even if Volkswagen never literally placed the mark on its
automobiles, the company and its dealers made extensive use of the
mark in commerce.
The second case involved the trademark registration for a
WUNDERBUG, a kit to convert the appearance of the front part of
a Volkswagen sedan that was sold by both independent distributors
206
and some Volkswagen dealers. Once again, while mentioning the
public use of the designation Bug, the TTAB relied on Volkswagen’s
extensive commercial use of the term, that Volkswagen had
registered the mark GLITTER BUG, and the media’s independent
207
use of the designation.
Finally, Volkswagen petitioned for the cancellation of the
registration of the mark in TULE BUG for a four-wheel drive off
road vehicle in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Lieffring
208
Industries, Inc. Since the registrant had not used the mark for over
209
two years, the TTAB found that the mark had been abandoned.
The germane point for this article was the TTAB’s finding that
Volkswagen had standing because it would be injured by the
continued registration of TULE BUG. The TTAB stated:

204. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Thermo-Chem Corporation, 185 U.S.P.Q.
561, 561 (T.T.A.B. 1975).
205. Id. at 562.
206. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Lieffring Industries, Inc., 188 U.S.P.Q.
650, 652-53 (T.T.A.B. 1975).
207. Id. at 653.
208. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Advance Welding and Mfg. Corp., 193
U.S.P.Q. 673, 675 (T.T.A.B. 1976).
209. Id. at 676.
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We find on the basis of the record herein that, as a result of
petitioner’s long and extensive use in its advertising and
material and many years use in a similar manner in the trade
and by the news media, petitioner has acquired a proprietary
right and hence a protectible [sic] right in “BUG” as an
associative term for its vehicles notwithstanding that
petitioner, insofar as this record shows, has never used
210
“BUG” alone in a trademark sense.
I will defer to the TTAB on whether Volkswagen used the
designation Bug in a trademark sense on automobiles, as the courts
construed the Lanham Act in 1975. But clearly Volkswagen, through
its extensive use of the mark in advertising to refer to its products,
had in some sense appropriated the mark. The TTAB further noted
that:
[i]n addition to use of the marks “VW” and
“VOLKSWAGEN” and the like to identify its vehicles in its
advertising and promotional material, [Volkeswagen] has,
since the early 1960’s, consistently used the terms “BUG” and
“BEETLE” in this material as terms of reference for its
vehicles. As a result of such use, the term “BUG” has also
been extensively used by the public and the trade to identify
211
petitioner’s vehicles.
The value in the term Bug, at least in this decision, was through
the efforts of Volkswagen to develop goodwill in the term. At a bare
minimum Volkswagen accepted the public’s gift of a designation and
then invested significantly in it in order to develop goodwill in the
designation.
In American Stock Exchange, Inc. v. American Express Co., two
titans battled over the rights to the mark AMEX for a broad array of
212
auxiliary financial services. American Express applied to register
AMEX for hotel services and financial services, from banking to
insurance to investments. The American Stock Exchange filed an
opposition. American Express then filed a petition for cancellation of
the American Stock Exchange’s AMEX mark for periodicals and
securities exchange services on the grounds that American Express

210. Id. at 675.
211. Id.
212. Am. Stock Ex., Inc. v. Am. Express Co., 207 U.S.P.Q. 356 (T.T.A.B. 1980).
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was the senior user of the AMEX mark. 213 Although the American
Stock Exchange can trace its lineage back to 1840, it did not begin to
use the name American Stock Exchange until 1953. Almost
immediately after changing its name, newspapers and members of the
industry started to refer to the American Stock Exchange as AMEX.
The American Stock Exchange also sued other businesses infringing
the AMEX trademark. American Express Co. traces its lineage to
1850 and has been providing various financial services since 1882.
There are records as early as 1854 using the term “Am. Ex. Co.” to
refer to American Express. Over time, “Am. Ex. Co.” evolved into
the term “Amexco.” As early as 1898, stock brokers referred to
American Express Co. as AM EX. However, American Express
Co.’s first use of the mark AMEX was as a service mark dated to
1969. American Express Co. also took steps to protect the mark
AMEX against infringing junior users.
The AMEX trademark case is another example of significant
public use by consumers, the industry, and the media, and some
internal use by the parties. The TTAB stated that priority could be
awarded based on analogous trademark uses. Analogous trademark
uses are uses in advertising, as a distinguishing feature of a trade
name, or as an acronym of a corporate name by the party asserting
214
rights in the mark. The TTAB then stated that the use must be
open, calculated to attract the attention of the viewer, and to create
an association with the goods or services in the relevant segment of
215
the public.
The TTAB, in a clear statement that the public may bestow a
protectable property right on a referent mark holder held that:
Further, it has been held that where the public has come to
associate a term with a particular company and/or its goods or
services as a result, for example, of use of the term in the trade
and by the news media, that company has a protectable
property right in the term even if the company itself has made
216
no use of the term.
It may have been scrivener’s error of omission by the TTAB or
merely inadvertent sloppy drafting, but it may also be significant that

213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 357-58.
Id. at 363.
Id.
Id. at 364 (emphasis added).
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the TTAB glaringly omitted of the word trademark as a qualifier for
the phrase “property right.” The TTAB could have clearly written “a
protectable [trademark] right.” A textual reading suggests that the
TTAB recognized some form of a property right but not necessarily a
trademark right. However, a subsequent TTAB case distinguished
this statement as mere dicta, so it may not be entitled to much weight
217
in future cases. Further, this statement relied on cases that have
been critically analyzed earlier in this article and shown to be not
218
clearly supporting this proposition. There was also substantial use
by both parties of the AMEX mark over a long period of time.
Furthermore, AMEX is phonetically similar to American Express for
trademark purposes, and may arguably just be the tacking on of
trademark rights based on the long use of the AMERICAN
219
EXPRESS mark.
In Big Blue Products Inc. v. International Business Machines
Corp., the TTAB qualified the position it had taken earlier in
220
American Express. IBM filed a trademark registration for the mark
221
BIG BLUE for typewriter ribbons. IBM rested its claim on the
extensive use by the public, the news media, and of course by IBM,
222
which predated the opposer’s first use in commerce. While in this
case, the court was prepared to accept that the public associated BIG
BLUE with IBM, there was a dispute of material fact regarding
whether the public understood the designation Big Blue as merely
another trade name for IBM, or whether it was associated with a
specific IBM product—a trademark for typewriter ribbon produced
by IBM. The TTAB then considered whether IBM’s other uses of
the mark BIG BLUE could be tacked on to its use of the mark with
typewriter ribbons. The end result of this case was that IBM might
not have had sufficient rights to register the mark, but it did have

217. Big Blue Products Inc. v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1072, 1074
n.2 (T.T.A.B. 1991).
218. See generally Part II.
219. The phonetics or sound of a mark is one of a mark’s most salient characteristics,
and is a significant element in whether the current use of a junior mark may have the same
priority date of a senior mark. See Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 19 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1074.
220. Id. At least one article opined, “the TTAB may have had some reservations
about the [p]ublic use rule and was not prepared to give it an unqualified endorsement.”
Brody, supra note 80, at 1149.
221. Id. at 1073.
222. Id. There is some suggestion in the record that IBM found the Big Blue reference
to be objectionable—at least at some point in the Company’s history.
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sufficient property rights under the natural expansion of business
223
doctrine to prevent the opposer from registering the mark.
These TTAB cases may best be characterized as analogous use
cases. An analogous use is an insufficient commercial use to
constitute a use in commerce for obtaining trademark owner rights,
where there could still be sufficient other uses to obtain limited rights,
such as the earlier priority date or the right to file an opposition to
224
another’s trademark registration. Under the doctrine of analogous
use, “[a]dvertising and promotion is sufficient to obtain rights in a
mark as long as they occur within a commercially reasonable time
225
They are also readily
prior to the actual rendition of service.”
distinguishable from the future crowd sourcing cases that this article
anticipates, where the mark is rapidly created and permeates the
market place without the referent-mark holder adopting the mark or
being able to demonstrate any internal or external use, and must rely
solely on some existing trademark doctrine, like the public use
doctrine, that would attribute actual non-commercial use by the
public as constructive trademark use by the referent-mark holder.
These TTAB cases and several other TTAB cases that were not
226
discussed in this article set the stage for National Cable Television
Ass’n, Inc. v. American Cinema Editors, Inc., in which the Federal
227
Circuit considered the trademark rights in the trade name ACE. In
1951, the American Cinema Editors, Inc. (“Editors”) was formed to
promote the art and science of film editing. It is an exclusive
invitation-only membership organization. Members are entitled to
use the acronym ACE after their names in television and motion
picture credits. Members of the media and motion picture industry
often shorten “American Cinema Editors” to ACE. Each year ACE
honors achievement by awarding the “A.C.E. Quarterly Awards”
which was shortened to “EDDIE” in 1962, and is also called the
228
“ACE EDDIE” or the “ACE AWARDS.”
In 1979, the National Cable Television Association, Inc.
(“Cable”), representing the cable television industry, created the
“ACE” award, an acronym for “Award for Cablecasting Excellence.”

223. Id. at 1075.
224. See MCCARTHY, supra note 85 at § 20:17.
225. Maryland Stadium Authority v. Becker, 806 F. Supp. 1236, 1239 (D. Md. 1992)
(internal citations and quotation omitted).
226. See generally Brody, supra note 80, at 1146-51.
227. See Am. Cinema Editors, 937 F.2d at 1574.
228. Id. at 1577.

GIBBONS_PRODUCTION_FINAL_2.DOCX

2012

CROWDSOURCING A TRADEMARK

79

The Editors immediately objected. Cable denied that its concurrent
use would create a likelihood of consumer confusion, but offered to
use the full name in addition to the ACE mark and to use its NCTA
logo in addition to ACE mark. Over time, Cable started to use ACE
mark alone, and did not comply with the offer it made in its letter,
leading to instances of actual confusion. In response, Cable
registered the ACE as its service mark. Apparently, unaware that
Cable had registered ACE as a service mark, Editors wrote and asked
Cable to change the name of its award. Upon discovering Cable’s
registration of the ACE mark, the Editors filed a timely petition to
cancel Cable’s registration of the ACE mark. The TTAB cancelled
Cable’s trademark registration, and Cable then appealed to the
229
Federal Circuit.
The dispute before the Federal Circuit focused on whether the
Editors had produced sufficient evidence to establish rights in ACE
as a trade name. The Editors had substantial evidence of third parties
230
using the term ACE as a trade name for the Editors award. Cable
focused the court’s attention on whether the Editors actually used
ACE as a trade name, as required under the plain language of
231
Lanham Act § 2(d). Although Editors had not adopted ACE as a
trade name in its by-laws or used it on its letterhead, Editors did use it
within the text of articles in its publications and correspondence, and
232
even published a commemorative book with ACE in the title.
Cable then questioned whether this use was sufficiently open and
notorious to establish trademark rights. The Federal Circuit rejected
Cable’s argument because the use was sufficiently public so that the
233
relevant public clearly identified ACE with the Editors.
In dicta, the court continued:
Moreover, even without use directly by the claimant of the
rights, the courts and the Board generally have recognized
that abbreviations and nicknames of trademarks or names
used only by the public give rise to protectable rights in the
owners of the trade name or mark which the public modified.
Such public use by others inures to the claimant’s benefit and,

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 1574.
Id. at 1577.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1580.
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where this occurs, public use can reasonably be deemed use
234
“by” that party in the sense of a use on its behalf.
The Federal Circuit continued that the Editors are not required to
meet the technical statutory requirements to obtain a trademark
registration in order to have a basis to oppose a trademark
registration, and found that Editors had sufficient use of the ACE
235
designation (trade name) to petition for the mark’s cancellation.
The TTAB cases following American Cinema Editors seemed to
be slowly working the public use doctrine into the case law—at least
as dicta in support of other independent grounds for the TTAB’s
ultimate holding. For example, in Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v.
Quest Associates, LTD, the applicant filed a registration for
236
Jack Daniel’s, a leading
COLAJACK for alcoholic beverages.
producer of Tennessee whiskey since 1866, filed an opposition. The
TTAB found that Jack Daniel’s clearly promoted itself as JACK and
produced numerous products where JACK, the disputed element of
the mark, was a significant element of the mark. However, the TTAB
237
did cite to American Cinema Editors and IBM in a footnote.
However, even with dicta in precedential TTAB decisions and
positive language in a Federal Circuit opinion, the public use doctrine
does not appear to be gaining acceptance as an independent basis on
which to award trademark rights. Rather, it is well grounded in the
doctrine of analogous trademark use and provides a ground on which
to oppose the registration of—or to petition for the cancellation of
the registration of — the mark.

V. Trademark Dilution
Even absent a likelihood of consumer confusion, famous marks
238
are protected against trademark dilution. This section will analyze
whether trademark dilution is sufficiently robust to protect the
owners of famous marks who do not appropriate public designations
or who may have abandoned them. Remember that all of the marks
where the court found that the public use doctrine applied involved
marks that would arguably be famous marks under the Lanham Act.

234.
235.
236.
2000)
237.
238.

Id. at 1577-78 (footnote citing cases omitted).
Id.
Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. Quest Assocs., LTD, 2000 WL 992415 (T.T.A.B.
Id. at *6 n.12.
Lanham Act § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (2006).
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Under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005 (TDRA), the
section 43(c) of the Lanham Act recognizes two types of trademark
239
In
dilution: dilution-by-blurring and dilution-by-tarnishment.
addition, some states have state trademark laws that protects
240
This section will focus on
distinctive as well as famous marks.
federal trademark dilution law. The elements for infringement of a
famous mark by trademark dilution under the TDRA are: first, the
241
mark must be famous; second, the defendant must be using a mark
in commerce in a manner that is blurring or tarnishing the famous
mark; third, the similarity between the defendant’s mark and the
famous mark must create an association between the two marks; and
finally, the association is likely to either blur the distinctiveness of the
242
famous mark or to tarnish the reputation of the famous mark.
A. Famous Mark

“[A] mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general
consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of
the goods or services of the mark’s owner.” 243 In determining whether
a mark is famous, Congress provided an illustrative set of relevant
factors that a court may consider: duration, extent, and geographic
extent of advertising or other publicity; amount, volume, and
geographic extent of the commercial use of the mark; extent of the
actual recognition of the mark; and whether the mark was ever
244
registered. The TDRA standard for a mark to be legally famous is
extremely high and should not be equated with “fame” for the
purposes of the likelihood of consumer confusion factors test.
Professor McCarthy observed that “[t]he standard for the kind of
‘fame’ needed to trigger anti-dilution protection is more rigorous and

239. Lanham Act § 43(c)(2)(B) & § 43(c)(2)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (2006).
240. SIEGRUN D. KANE, KANE ON TRADEMARK LAW § 9:2.1; § 9:6.4; MARK S. LEE,
ENTERTAINMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 2:91.
241. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 264-65
(4th Cir. 2007).
242. Id. at 265.
243. Lanham Act § 43(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (2006). . The TDRA legislatively
overruled earlier circuit case law under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) that
recognized something called “niche fame.” See Coach Serv., Inc. v. Triumph Learning
LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012). (Even niche fame was a high hurdle to
prove.) See Grupo Gigante SA De Cv v. Dalos & Co., Inc., 391 F.3d 1088, 1108 (9th Cir.
2004) ( “a mark should not be categorized as ‘famous’ unless it is known to more than 50
percent of the defendant’s potential customersquoting MCCARTHY, supra note 85 at §
24:1112)
244. Lanham Act § 43(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (2006).
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demanding than the ‘fame’ which is sufficient for the classic
245
“While fame for dilution “is an
likelihood of confusion test.”
either/or proposition”—it either exists or does not—fame for
likelihood of confusion is a matter of degree along a continuum.
Accordingly, a mark can acquire “sufficient public recognition and
renown to be famous for purposes of likelihood of confusion without
246
meeting the more stringent requirement for dilution fame.” Courts
have observed that it is “well-established that dilution fame is difficult
247
to prove,” placing a rigorous burden on the plaintiff.
In the introduction to this article, there was a brief discussion of
the mark APP STORE as an example of the brevity from first use in
commerce to a credible claim to achieving famous mark status in both
the Web 2.0 and social media context. The APP STORE mark case
also shows the difficulty of achieving the level of consumer awareness
necessary to establish that a mark is truly a famous mark.
Apple asserts that it has used the “App Store” mark for over
three years; the mark has been exposed to the owners of more than
160 million Apple mobile devices worldwide; consumers have
downloaded software applications more than 10 billion times; the
mark has been the subject of extensive advertising across the United
States with hundreds of millions of dollars spent on advertising; the
mark has garnered significant Web presence and unsolicited thirdparty publications discussing the brand; the mark has a robust
presence throughout the United States and abroad; and that the mark
248
has been registered by Apple in more than fifty countries.
Considering the section 43(c)(2)(a) statutory factors such as “(1)
the duration, extent, and geographic reach of advertising and
publicity of the mark, whether advertised or publicized by the owner
or third parties; (2) the amount, volume, and geographic extent of
sales of goods or services offered under the mark; (3) the extent of
249
actual recognition of the mark,” the APP STORE mark should be
an easy case for a court to find that the mark qualified as a famous
mark. However, the court rejected Apple’s claim that APP STORE
was a famous mark, and concluded that:

245. MCCARTHY, supra note 85, at § 24:104 (internal citations omitted) (quoted in
Coach Serv., Inc., 668 F.3d at 1372).
246. Coach Serv., Inc., 668 F.3d at 1372.
247. Id. at 1373.
248. Apple, Inc. v. Amazon.com Inc., 100 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1835, 1842 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
249. See Lanham Act 43(c)(2)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (2006).
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First, Apple has not established that its “App Store” mark is
famous, in the sense of being “prominent” and “renowned.”
The evidence does show that Apple has spent a great deal of
money
on
advertising
and
publicity,
and
has
sold/provided/furnished a large number of apps from its
AppStore, and the evidence also reflects actual recognition of
the “App Store” mark. However, there is also evidence that
the term “App store” is used by other companies as a
descriptive term for a place to obtain software applications for
250
mobile devices.
Consequently, trademark dilution may prove to be an illusory
remedy to the vast majority of referent-mark holders, except for those
who own the most valuable and well-established trademarks.
B. Use of Mark in Commerce

If the owner of the mark surmounts the difficult obstacle of
proving that the mark is truly famous and not a merely generally wellknown mark or a mark having renown in a niche market, the mark
owner under the facts of the types of cases analyzed in this article will
251
have the relatively easy burden of showing commercial use. This
article focuses on the public designations which were either
unclaimed or affirmatively rejected by the holder of the famous mark,
which have now been appropriated by a competitor or other
commercial entity. However, the appropriation of the public
designation by a competitor, even if it is solely to prevent the
referent-mark owner from using or adopting the public designation,
should be a sufficiently commercial use to justify a finding of
trademark commercial use. Accordingly, because use of the mark in
commerce is a relatively low barrier, it should be easy to demonstrate
252
at trial.

250. Apple, Inc., 100 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1844.
251. The issues raised in Part II.B of this article regarding what constitutes “use in
commerce” also applies with equal force to actions brought under section 43(c)(1) for
infringement by dilution. Lanham Act § 43(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (2006) (“The owner of
a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and upon such terms as
the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against another person’s commercial use in
commerce of a mark or trade name,”). However, use by a competitor is more likely to be
in the ordinary course of trade than use by the public.
252. Cf.
Gideons Intern., Inc.
v.
Gideon 300 Ministries, Inc.
94 F. Supp. 2d 566, 577 (E.D. Pa. 1999)(commercial use by non-profit competitors).
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C. Similarity of The Marks

In determining whether a junior user’s use of a designation dilutes
the distinctiveness of the famous mark the court must consider the
degree of similarity between the two. Section 43(c) “does not require
that a plaintiff establish that the junior mark is identical, nearly
identical or substantially similar to the senior mark in order to obtain
253
Similarity of the mark and the designation is
injunctive relief.”
merely one of the six factors that a court must consider in
determining whether the junior user’s use of the mark is likely to
254
impair the distinctiveness of the famous mark. In Starbucks Corp.
v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., Starbucks alleged that the
defendant’s mark for coffee CHARBUCKS diluted its famous
STARBUCKS mark. The Second Circuit rejected the proposition
that “dissimilarity alone is sufficient to defeat” a trademark dilution
255
claim. Therefore, a competitor’s use of a public designation, even if
the designation in terms of sight, sound, or meaning is far from that of
the famous mark, may still dilute the distinctiveness of the famous
mark by blurring.
D. Blurring or Tarnishment of the Famous Mark

Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act prohibits uses of a designation
that may lessen the distinctiveness of a famous trademark. The
FTDA recognizes dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment as
two forms of trademark dilution. This section will discuss both forms
of trademark dilution and conclude that dilution by blurring is likely
to occur in the context of a competitor using a public designation that
is associated by the public with the famous mark even absent
appropriation of the designation by the referent famous mark
256
holder.
1.

Dilution by Blurring

Dilution by blurring is an “association arising from the similarity
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the

253. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 633 F.3d 1158,
1172 (9th Cir. 2011).
254. Id.
255. Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 107-08 (2d Cir.
2009).
256. Noncommercial use is a defense under setion 43(c), so the owner of the famous
mark is unlikely to have a claim against the public or the media. See 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c)(3). Cf. Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 934 n.2 (D.D.C.
1985).
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distinctiveness of the famous mark.” 257 Secondary meaning may
create such an association. The mere use of a similar mark that calls
to mind the famous mark is insufficient to find the required
258
association. The owner of the famous mark is always required to
show that the association likely impairs the distinctiveness of the
mark. Clearly, if the use of the public designation is confusingly
similar to the famous mark, then the famous mark is likely to be
diluted. However, if the designation and its commercial use by a
competitor are able to send two simultaneous and contradictory
messages—a message that calls to mind the famous mark while
simultaneously conveying that it is not the source of the famous
mark—then there is no association that impairs the distinctiveness of
259
the mark (blurring) for trademark dilution. Outside the trademark
parody context, it is unlikely that a public designation that is being
used by a competitor will able to call to mind the famous mark for the
product associated while being able to simultaneously distinguish
itself from the famous mark.
2.

Dilution by Tarnishment

Dilution by tarnishment is an “association arising from the
similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that
260
harms the reputation of the famous mark.” Tarnishment has not
been illustratively defined, except as a semantic association with
261
bawdy or lewd sex (or products associated with sex). Not all public
designations are positive or convey in the opinion of the mark holder
the appropriate consistent brand image. In determining which
associations are tarnishing to a brand, courts engage in “an economic
prediction about consumer taste and how the prediction reaction of

257. Lanham Act § 43(c)(2)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (2006).
258. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d at 267.
259. Id. at 268.
260. Lanham Act § 43(c)(2)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (2006).
261. See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 387-88 (6th Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1003 (2011). The author assumes that the court’s limitation on sex
so that it encompassed only bawdy or lewd sex (as opposed to tasteful sex) was a
requirement in light of Victoria Secret’s preeminent reputation for offering fashionable
and sexually suggestive undergarments for women. See KIT YARROW AND JAYNE
O’DONNELL, GEN BUY: HOW TWEENS, TEENS AND TWENTY-SOMETHINGS ARE
REVOLUTIONIZING RETAIL. 31 (Jossey-Bass 2009). See also Moseley v. V. Secret
Catalogue, Inc, 537 U.S. 418, 425 n. 3 (2002) (“Victoria’s Secret stores sell a complete line
of lingerie, women’s undergarments and nightwear, robes, caftans and kimonos, slippers,
sachets, lingerie bags, hanging bags, candles, soaps, cosmetic brushes, atomizers, bath
products and fragrances.”).
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conventional consumers in our culture will affect the economic value
262
of the famous mark.”
As discussed earlier, Coca-Cola discouraged consumers from
asking for “Coke” when they wanted a Coca-Cola brand beverage,
and Harley-Davidson discouraged consumer and media use of the
263
designation Hog to refer to its brand of motorcycles. This trend
continues. Tasteful modern examples of arguably unflattering
designations are “whole paycheck,” for the food retailer Whole
Foods, or “needless mark-up” for the Neiman Marcus department
store chain, or other designations that may be neutral, inconsistent,
consistent, or even flattering with the brand’s image such as Tarjay or
264
Tarzhay for Target Stores. Many of the public’s designations may
be scurrilous, vulgar, pornographic, or even border on the obscene.
However, these terms are unlikely to be appropriated by a
competitor, and if they are appropriated, they are likely candidates
for a successful dilution by tarnishment trademark infringement
265
action.
E. Abandonment

Unlike traditional trademark infringement based on the
likelihood of consumer confusion caused by the junior user’s use of
the mark in commerce, the Lanham Act does not require that the
holder of the famous mark also own the junior mark that allegedly
266
dilutes the senior famous mark. The use or threatened use of a
public designation that dilutes a famous mark is sufficient to state a
claim even if the holder of the famous mark has no legal interest in

262. Moseley, 605 F.3d at 388.
263. See Part III.C.
264. See John Letzing, CEO bemoans ‘Whole Paycheck’ nickname.,WALL ST. J., Mar.
3,
2011,
available
at
http://articles.marketwatch.com/2011-0303/industries/30736343_1_foods-market-executive-john-mackey-unhealthy-items.
265. The designation may not be eligible for registration under section 2(a) of the
Lanham Act as immoral, scandalous, or disparaging. See In Re McGinley, 600 F.2d 481,
485 (C.C.P.A. 1981)(refusal to register immoral, scandalous, or disparaging marks under
section 2(a) of the Lanham Act not a First Amendment violation). Also, such a mark may
not be protected under common law. See Stephen R. Baird, Moral Intervention in the
Trademark Arena; Banning the Registration of Scandalous and Immoral Trademarks, 83
TRADEMARK REP. 661, 793-94 (1993); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, Semiotics Of The
Scandalous and The Immoral and The Disparaging: Section 2(A) Trademark Law After
Lawrence v. Texas, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 187, 232 (1995).
266. See Visa Intern. Service Ass’n v. JSL Corp., 610 F.3d 1088, 1089-90 (9th Cir.
2010). By definition of trademark dilution, there are two marks a senior famous mark,
and a junior mark that is owned by another which is allegedly diluting the distinctiveness
of the senior mark. See id.
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the junior mark. At least one article contends that even an
abandoned mark by a famous mark holder may serve as a basis for a
267
claim for dilution of a currently famous mark.

VI. Unfair Competition, False Advertising, and Other Claims
Although trademark infringement may not provide a remedy to
the referent-mark holder against a competitor adopting or using a
confusingly similar public designation, the mark holder is not without
remedies. Unfair competition law is one available remedy. There
are also potential remedies under section 43(a)(2) of the Lanham Act
for false advertising, section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, which prohibits “deceptive acts or practices,” or its state mini268
FTC Act analogs. A creative attorney is sure to find other possible
claims, especially under state law, to protect the holder of the
referent-mark against use of a publically coined designation by other
commercial entities.
A. Unfair Competition

The law of unfair competition is robust and prohibits many forms
269
of unfair competition, and ownership of the publicly coined
designation by the plaintiff is not necessarily an element of an unfair
270
competition. “Some courts have even said that unfair competition
is ‘the umbrella for all statutory and non-statutory causes of action
arising out of business conduct that is contrary to honest practice in
271
The early cases involving
industrial and commercial matters.’”
confusing public designations were readily resolved on principles of
272
So, whether unfair competition provides
unfair competition law.
judicial remedy will not be developed further in this section. Unfair
competition still remains a ready remedy in many of the situations
discussed in this article and for the future protection of crowd sourced
publicly coined designations that this article analyzes.

267. See Don Nottingham, Comment: Keeping the Home Team at Home: Antitrust and
Trademark Law as Weapons in the Fight Against Professional Sports Franchise Relation,
75 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 1094-95 (2004).
268. See, e.g., Vermont v. Int’l Collection Serv., Inc. 594 A.2d 426, 430-31 (Vt.
1991)(describing state mini-FTC Acts).
269. MCCARTHY, supra note 97 at § 1:8 & 1:9.
th
270. See Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 97, 103 (5 Cir.
19982).
271. LOUIS ALTMAN AND MALLA POLLACK, 1 CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMP., TR.
& MONO. § 2:2 (4th ed.)(footnote omitted).
272. See Brody, supra note 80, at 1126-31; Section II.C.1.
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The only underlying principle which has been developed in
the field of unfair trade practices is the principle of passing
off, which ‘affords relief wherever, by reason of an
unjustifiable act, the goods of one party to the suit will
probably be accepted by the purchasing public as the goods of
273
another.
So, the law not only prohibits harm to a company’s good will that
is a result of deceptive marking, trademark infringement, and the
274
misappropriation of intangible trade values, such as trade secrets,
but also dilution of trade symbols, the misappropriation of business
values, and even causes of action relating to broader competition
275
law. Using a public designation to pass off the goods or services of
a competitor as those of the referent mark holder would surely fall
under the rubric of unfair competition even absent any trademark use
276
of the public designation by the referent-mark holder. Although
state unfair competition laws may prohibit other acts in addition to
passing off, state common law or statutory remedies for unfair
competition are usually at least as extensive as section 43(a)’s
prohibition on “false designations of origin” or passing off and often
277
provide additional causes of action.
B. False Advertising

Crowd sourced marks raise novel issues of trademark law. So far
courts have not applied section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act’s
prohibition on false statements of fact in commercial advertising to
disputes regarding confusion as to source, origin, or sponsorship.278
Confusion as to source, origin, or sponsorship claims are usually
brought under section 43(a)(1)(A). However, courts over the past
fifty years have continually expanded the reach of section
279
43(a)(1)(B). There is a possibility that new forms of advertising and
uses of marks may result in the designation being used in a manner

273. Altman and Pollack, supra note 236.
274. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 1 (1995)
275. Altman and Pollack, supra note 271.
276. See Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 29 (2003).
277. See Buying For The Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F.Supp.2d 310,
317 (D. N.J. 2006).
278. See Lanham Act § 43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (2006). .
279. See generally Bruce P Keller, “It Keeps Going and Going and Going”: The
Expansion of False Advertising Litigation under the Lanham Act, 59 SPG LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 132-33 (1996).
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that is understood by the public as a statement of fact and therefore
280
actionable under section 43(a)(1)(B). Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the
Lanham Act provides that
[a]ny person . . . in commercial advertising or promotion, that
misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or
geographic origin of his or her or another person’s goods,
services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil
action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely
281
to be damaged by such act.
This section confers standing on competitors or other commercial
entities that are not necessarily claiming trademark rights in the
282
public designation. The elements of a section 43(a)(1)(B) claim are
that the defendant made false or misleading factual representations;
that the defendant used the false or misleading representations in
commerce; that the deceptions are material and likely to influence
consumer decisions; and that the defendant’s actions made the
plaintiff believe that it is likely to be damaged by such false or
283
So, ownership of the mark is
misleading factual representations.
not an element of false advertising.
The courts analyze the advertisement from the perspective of a
284
Courts have categorized false or deceptive
reasonable person.
285
commercial speech as either explicitly or implicitly false. Explicitly
286
and implicitly false statements are analyzed differently. An explicit
or literally false statement is a statement that is false on its face.
287
An implicitly
Implicitly false statements are more problematic.
false statement is a statement that is literally true but likely to mislead
288
With an implicitly false
a significant portion of consumers.
statement, before enjoining the advertisement, the court will require
evidence of how the message conveyed by the statement is

280. I will leave flushing out this hypothetical to another article, commentator to
another day, or await the inevitable complaint raising this issue.
281. Lanham Act §43(a)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 1126 (2006).
282. See 5 MCCARTHY, supra note 183 at § 27:32 (discussing standing under Lanham
Act §43(a)(1)(B)).
283. See American Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 390 (8th
Cir. 2004). See also MCCARTHY, supra note 245 at § 27:55.
284. See Freeman v. Time, Inc., 68 F.3d 285, 289 (9th Cir. 1995).
285. See Johnson & Johnson v. GAC Intern., Inc., 862 F.2d 975, 977 (2d Cir. 1988).
286. See id.
287. See id.
288. See id.
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understood by reasonable consumers. 289 The plaintiff has to produce
evidence that consumers were actually deceived, not that they may
290
This evidentiary burden requires that the
have been deceived.
plaintiff produce consumer surveys or other evidence of consumer
291
perceptions of the advertisement. There is no bright line rule as to
292
how many consumers must be deceived.
However, the plaintiff may avoid the need for consumer surveys if
the plaintiff is able to demonstrate that the defendant egregiously and
293
intentionally set out to deceive the public. If so, then the court may
presume that the public was in fact deceived. Once the court finds
deceptive intent, the burden will then shift to the defendant to show
294
that consumers were not deceived. In the prototypical case that this
article posits, it is clearly the competitor that will adopt the
designation with knowledge that it refers to the referent-mark holder.
Whether this fact standing alone will demonstrate or create a
295
presumption of bad faith is questionable. The seminal article on the
public use doctrine recommends that courts focus on the meaning of
296
Semiotic
the public designation rather than its appearance.
meaning of the publicly coined designation both refers back to the
referent-mark, and potentially carries additional socially laden
297
meaning to the consumer and the public. Under principles of false
advertising, if the court must consider how the consumer understood
the message in the context of the marketplace, and if the public
designation, no matter how different from the referent-mark, is
merely another name for the referent-mark, then the use of the public
designation by a competitor in advertising to refer to someone other
than the referent-mark holder is impermissible.
C. The Federal Trade Commission Act and State Mini-FTC Acts

Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and its state
Little-FTC analogs outlaw all unfair and deceptive consumer trade

289. See id.
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. MCCARTHY, supra note 183 at § 27:57
293. See GAC Intern., Inc., 862 F.2d at 977.
294. See id.
295. But see Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 354 (knowing adoption of a trademark of another
creates a presumption of bad faith).
296. See Brody, supra 73, at 1164.
297. See generally Sonia Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 489
(2006).
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practices. 298 Unfortunately, there is only an extremely weak case to
be made for a plaintiff to assert that section 5 provides a private cause
299
of action. However, private parties have standing under many state
300
Courts have found that an act is unfair or
Little FTC Acts.
301
deceptive under section 5, if it has as tendency to deceive the public.
Unlike the Lanham Act, which protects only reasonable and prudent
consumers in the context of the marketplace, the section 5 protects:
“the public-that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the
302
as long as they are acting
unthinking, and the credulous,”
303
reasonably under the circumstances.
Arguably, if the public
designates Peanuts for a chain of restaurants with the trademark
PEEBODY, then members of the public, even those more
sophisticated than the ignorant and the credulous, would be deceived
if a competitor started to use the public designation Peanuts to
describe its goods or services.
Section 52 of the FTC Act specifically provides that the
dissemination of a false advertisement is an unfair and deceptive
trade practice if the advertised product consists of food, drugs, or
304
An advertisement is false if it contains materially
cosmetics.
305
misleading content. Content is material if it is of the type that a
consumer would rely in making a purchasing decision. Identification
or association with well-known products is the bedrock of trademark
goodwill and the type of information that consumers are likely to rely
on.
While the FTC Act does not provide an adequate remedy to
private parties, it does admit the potential of a regulatory remedy for
the misappropriation of a crowd sourced publically coined
298. See 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(1); Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1172 (11th
Cir. 1985); Int’l Collection Serv., Inc., 594 A.2d at 430-31.
299. See Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 406 F. Supp. 582, 586-87 (N.D. Ind.
1976) (applying the “doctrine of implication” to find federal jurisdiction under §5 of the
FTC Act), but see ABA Distributors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 496 F. Supp. 1194, 1199
(D. Mo. 1980). See also STEPHANIE W. KANWIT, 1 FED. TRADE COMM’N § 6:8 (2012);
Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under The Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: Reconsidering The
FTC Act As Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 440 n.21 (1991)(citing extensive
authorities for the proposition that there is no private right of action under §5 of the FTC
Act.).
300. See Brian D. Wright, Social Media and Marketing: Exploring the Legal Pitfalls of
User-Generated Content, 36 U. DAYTON L. REV. 67, 71 (2010).
301. Jeter v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 760 F.2d 1168, 1172 (11th Cir. 1985).
302. Id. at 1172-73.
303. See F.T.C. v. Cantkier, 767 F. Supp. 2d 147, 151-52 (D.D.C. 2011).
304. 15 U.S.C. §52 (2006).
305. 15 U.S.C. §55 (2006).
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designation. However, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act’s unfair
competition provisions, coupled with state unfair competition law and
the possibility of false advertising claims taken together, provide a
robust remedy for the appropriation of a publicly coined designation
that is used in a manner that deceives the public.

VII.Conclusion
Unlike love, which it is said “changes everything,” 306 Web 2.0 and
the new forms of social media, merely rearrange, reprioritize, and
reallocate power-relations; and therefore, may require the re-thinking
of existing trademark law. The trademark law regarding ownership
or rights in the crowd-sourced mark is unclear. A leading trademark
commentator and trademark treatise author, Professor McCarthy
stated that:
One court has said that it is “doubtful” whether a
manufacturer can claim protection for an abbreviation that
only the public and not the manufacturer has used. Other
decisions indicate that where, as a result of use by customers,
the trade or by the news media, an abbreviation has become
identified in the public mind with a particular company, then
that abbreviation is a protectable trademark, even if the
company itself has not formally used the abbreviation as a
307
trademark mark.
The author of the leading law review article on the publicly
coined trademarks observed that courts are “hesitant to recognize
valuable property rights in a name that has not been used by the party
308
claiming those rights.” Yet, these publicly coined designations are
becoming increasingly commercially significant as Web 2.0 and social
media technologies amplify the ability of consumers to affect brand
image and nomenclature. Therefore, a prudent attorney would not
rely on a court electing to give his client trademark rights that the
client has not yet appropriated through its own use by imputing the
public’s use of the designation as a constructive use by the client. The
prudent approach is to monitor terms used by the public to designate
a client’s products or services then appropriate the trademark rights
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308. See Brody, supra note 80, at 1159.
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in the term as the earliest possible date. One should rely, only if
necessary, on the public’s use of the designation as either evidence of
secondary meaning to establish an early priority date, or as a ground
for opposition to a trademark registration or as a ground supporting a
petition to cancel a trademark registration.
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